

TIME IN EXPERIENCE: REPLY TO GALLAGHER

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PSYCHE:

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ABSTRACT: Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In *Stream of Consciousness* I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl were fundamentally flawed, and proposed a quite different account: the overlap model. While recognizing that the latter has merits, Gallagher argues that it too is fundamentally flawed; he also takes issue with some of my claims concerning Broad and Husserl. My reply comes in three main parts. I start by clarifying my use of certain terms, in particular *realism* and *anti-realism* as applied to theories of phenomenal temporality in general, and the accounts of Broad and Husserl in particular. I then turn to Gallagher's main criticisms of the overlap theory. Gallagher argues that the theory is sunk by a problem with *ongoing contents*, that if our experience possessed the structures I ascribe to it, we would be aware of contents as having longer durations than is actually the case. I suggest otherwise: the version of the overlap theory which is afflicted by this difficulty is not the version I put forward, as becomes clear when two distinct forms of overlap are distinguished. Gallagher is also concerned that the theory lacks phenomenological grounding, and has difficulties with experiential holism. The latter worry, I argue, is completely misplaced. While the former has more warrant, it too is rooted in a misconception: the overlap theory was intended only to provide an account of the most basic sensory components of our short-term experience of temporality, and can easily be expanded to accommodate other aspects. I supply a sketch an *augmented* theory to back up this claim. I conclude with an assessment of the *intentional* account of time-consciousness Gallagher ascribes to Husserl. A meaning-based account of this kind is incapable of accounting for experienced sensory continuity, or so I argue. I also suggest that both Broad and Husserl may have had leanings towards the Simple Conception of consciousness.

1. INTRODUCTION

I am very grateful to Gallagher for the work he has put into my chapters on the phenomenology of time. His paper is full of good things: useful historical background, relevant conceptual distinctions, insightful interpretive points on Broad and Husserl, not to mention numerous probing objections to, and questions concerning, the positive account of the structure of temporal experience I develop in chapter 7 of *Stream of Consciousness* (*SoC*). Some of Gallagher's objections are of sufficient weight that this account would deservedly sink without a trace if answers to them could not be found. But answers, adequate answers, are available - or so I believe, and will endeavour to show. The most serious objections, it turns out, are all rooted in misunderstandings, of one sort or another. That these misunderstandings occurred is, of course, mostly my fault. Grappling with the issues Gallagher raises has made me painfully aware of the inadequacies of my exposition at certain places, and I welcome this opportunity to have another go, and clarify what should not have needed clarifying.

In what follows I have tried to deal with all Gallagher's main points. These points are many and varied, so rather than dealing with them in the order in which they arise in Gallagher's paper, I have organized my replies around certain themes. Section 2 is taken up with a number of preliminary terminological and conceptual issues. I begin by clarifying what I meant by *content*, *realism* and *anti-realism*; if Gallagher found my usage confusing, others might too. This requires a brief detour through Broad's early and later accounts. I also discuss Gallagher's *Lotzean Assumptions* and the *principle of simultaneous awareness*. In section 3 the main topic is the A-theory version of the overlap model, and Gallagher's *ongoing contents* objection, but I also start to address some of Gallagher's worries concerning the very possibility of overlaps in consciousness.

The *Simple overlap* model then comes to the fore, the version of the model which does not rely on the (to my mind) erroneous awareness-content conception of consciousness. The basic ingredients of this account are introduced in section 4, with particular reference to the character of the phenomenal present. Gallagher argues that the Simple overlap theory cannot be reconciled with the holistic nature of consciousness; in section 5 I argue that the situation is quite the reverse. Gallagher also claims that the overlap theory fails to accommodate the phenomenological data: he is unable to discern overlaps in his own stream of consciousness, and there are certain aspects of temporal awareness which the theory ignores. In section 6 I explain why how and why overlaps *can* be discerned, and suggest ways in which the basic overlap model can be augmented so as to cater for the supposedly missing ingredients.

I conclude by taking up some of the points Gallagher raises in connection with Husserl's shifting views on time-consciousness. Some similarities - and differences - between Husserl and Broad are noted in section 7, where I also discuss the role of momentary acts in early Husserl. In section 8 I critically examine the theory Gallagher ascribes to (later) Husserl. Section 9 is more speculative: I suggest Husserl

himself might not have been entirely happy with the theory Gallagher attributes to him.

2. THE PHENOMENAL PRESENT: REALISM V. ANTI-REALISM

Our experience of motion and change is just as direct and immediate as our experience of colour or sound. So much is obvious. Rather less obvious, but no less real, is the direct experience of constancy or endurance. The experience of seeing a flame flicker has a distinctive phenomenal character, but so too has the experience of observing an expanse of unvarying white, or hearing an unvarying tone, or the often unnoticed range of bodily experiences that together form the constant backdrop to our conscious lives. Despite their qualitatively unvarying nature, experiences of the latter sort are inherently dynamic: they *flow on*, there is a constant renewal or replacement or succession of sensory material - or so it seems. Although most noticeable in qualitatively stable experiences, this *phenomenal flow* is a general feature of our consciousness.

Obtaining a clear grasp of the basic phenomenological data is one thing, understanding how it is possible for experience to have the features it does is quite another. We can remember the past and anticipate the future, but our immediate experience is confined to the present, or so it seems natural to suppose. But given the fact that we directly apprehend change and persistence, albeit only over quite short intervals, the *present of experience* - the *phenomenal* or *specious* present - cannot straightforwardly be equated with the *mathematical* present, i.e. the durationless dividing line between past and future. If change and persistence are directly experienced, the phenomenal present cannot be strictly instantaneous, it must - in some manner - have some duration.

Here a second line of reasoning enters the picture. For many who have pondered the puzzles of temporal awareness, the beginnings of wisdom are to be found in clearly recognizing that a succession of experiences does not, in itself, amount to an experience *of* succession. Given that this is the case, we can immediately draw an important conclusion. Since a typical phenomenal present *is* an experience of succession (or persistence), it cannot be composed of a succession of durationless experiences that are related by nothing more than temporal proximity. It may well be that instantaneous experiences do exist - if only as ideal limits - but if so, something must serve to bind them together into the experienced successions with which we are familiar. The question is: what?

Those who subscribe to the A-theory - i.e., those who take the view that an experience always consists of a content (or object) falling under an act of awareness - have what looks to be a promising solution to this temporal binding problem. A-theorists can hold that a succession of brief (or momentary) contents are experienced as a succession if they are apprehended by a single act of awareness. Miller (1984, 109) calls this idea the *principle of simultaneous awareness*, or *PSA* for short. If we suppose, as seems plausible, that we are continuously aware, from moment to moment, we will quickly find ourselves drawn to the view that at each moment we are aware of a temporal spread of content.

This basic insight - as some would regard it - can be, and has been, developed in two very different ways, each of which leads to a different conception of the nature of phenomenal presents.

One option is to hold that a momentary (or very brief) act of awareness apprehends a succession of content that is spread through a real interval of time. On this view, an *act* of awareness may be momentary, but its scope is not. The content that is apprehended may be physical or phenomenal, this account is neutral in this regard. The key point is that temporally extended stretches or successions of content are apprehended, as temporally extended wholes, by single acts of awareness that are momentary, or close to it. Since on this view we are *directly* aware of temporally extended occurrences, I call it *realism*. According to the naive (or *direct*) realist theory of vision, we are directly aware of the material objects we see around us - no inner representation lies between them and us. In analogous fashion, the temporal realist holds that we are directly aware of change and persistence.

The realist approach may be straightforward, but in one respect it is also counterintuitive. It grants to conscious awareness a remarkable property: the ability to directly apprehend occurrences that lie short distances in the past.<1> Consciousness, on this view, has an ability normally associated with crystal balls and clairvoyants! Anyone who finds this problematic, but who also wants to retain PSA along with the A-theory, has another option: to hold (i) that the contents apprehended by momentary acts of awareness are themselves momentary, but (ii) that these contents *appear* to be temporally extended. On this view, we are not really aware of the recent past, we only seem to be, but the illusion is entirely convincing. Since on this conception of the phenomenal present we are not truly aware of temporally extended occurrences, but only seem to be, I call it *anti-realism*. A more informative label is *representational anti-realism*: although we seem to be directly aware of temporally extended occurrences, in reality we are only aware of representations of such occurrences. Since these representations are phenomenal mental states, anti-realists do not have the option of adopting naive realism about the perception of change; the possibility of embracing naive realism about the momentary present remains open.

An anti-realist could object:

"The experience of change and duration on my account is just as *real* as that found in the doctrine you are calling *realism*. In the realm of the phenomenal there is no distinction between *seeming* and *being*. Phenomenal presents, as I construe them, *seem* temporally extended, so they *are* temporally extended - at least on the phenomenological level."

This is perfectly true. For an anti-realist account to be viable it has to accommodate the phenomenological data; since we do experience change and duration, the anti-realist's representations must provide us with an immediate experience of change and duration. But there remains a difference. For the anti-realist, awareness of the just-past is supplied by freshly generated new contents which *seem* just-past, whereas for the realist, it is supplied by an awareness of the just-past contents themselves. To bring this difference clearly into view

it suffices to remind ourselves of Broad's early and later accounts, along with some of the problems these accounts face.

The account of the temporality of experience Broad develops in *"Scientific Thought"* is clearly realist. He held that the phenomenal present consisted of a momentary (or very brief) act of awareness stretching a short way back in time - see Figure 1.

Figure 1
Broad's early conception of the specious present.

Although he developed this basic idea in various interesting ways, he seemingly failed to recognize a simple but serious difficulty with it. If, as Broad also held, we are *"continuously"* aware, then the same contents will end up being experienced over and over again - as can be seen in Figure 2, where the brief content C (a short-lived tone) is first experienced as a whole by A1, then again by A2, and then again by A3, together with all the acts in between (which for convenience are not depicted). As is plain, there is nothing in our experience which corresponds with this endless repeating of contents: we can, and often do, hear a single tone just once.

Figure 2
The problem of repeated contents

Gallagher correctly points out that in *"Scientific Thought"* Broad took the view that momentary acts of awareness did not really exist, that all actual acts are of short but finite duration. It may also be true that Broad would have preferred to think in terms of a continuous uninterrupted awareness of a single content, rather than distinct episodes of awareness in which the same content is repeated. But there is no real gain. The extended act which apprehends C consists of phases, and given the fact that *"each"* phase of this continuous awareness apprehends the *"full"* temporal extent of C, we are still confronted with a situation in which the experienced character of C is misrepresented. Suppose C's duration is half of a second, and to keep things simple, let us further suppose that my continuous awareness of C has just three phases. By the end of the third and final phase, C's apparent duration will be a full one and a half seconds, rather than the half a second that (in reality) I experience. Repeated contents have merely given way to *"stretched contents"*.

It is possible that Broad became aware of this difficulty. In any event, in his later accounts of temporal awareness Broad rejected realism in favour of a version of (representational) anti-realism. The basics of the new account are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3
Broad's later conception of time-consciousness.

The diagram on the left depicts the way in which the phases of a short stretch of recently experienced content become represented in a single momentary phenomenal present. The diagram on the right shows how a single (very) brief content is represented in successive phenomenal presents. The smaller the content, the *"less present"* or *"more past"* it seems to be. In effect, contents such as these are experienced as *"moving through"* consciousness, appearing first as fully present before embarking on a smooth, continuous slippage into the past. The problem of repeated contents is thus avoided: there is repetition, but this is accompanied by a continual variation in temporal mode of presentation.

Note the way in which each phenomenal present is an entirely new production. Neighbouring phenomenal presents may reveal almost the same stretch of the recent past, but they do so via freshly minted representations, each possessing its own inherent temporal depth. In Broad's earlier (realist) account, numerically the same content is apprehended in successive acts; in his later (anti-realist) account, this is no longer the case.

In *"SoC"* I criticized representational anti-realist models on several counts, and there is no need for these criticisms to be rehearsed in detail here. But there are two key problems to which I want to draw attention - their relevance will become obvious when we turn to consider the Husserlian theory sympathetically expounded by Gallagher. The first problem is the *"atomistic"* character of the basic model. How is the moment-to-moment continuity of experience to be secured if a stream of consciousness is composed of a succession of entirely distinct experiences? Neighbouring phenomenal presents may have similar representational contents, but there is no real experiential connection between them, each consists of a discrete experience in its own right. This is profoundly unrealistic: are we not aware - directly aware - of the transitions between the successive phases of our streams of consciousness?

The second problem concerns the anti-realist conception of the phenomenal present. How is it possible for change and persistence, as they feature in immediate experience, to be represented or encoded in contents that are not only simultaneous but strictly momentary? Broad posits an intrinsic phenomenal property he calls *"presentedness"*, which can be possessed by experiential contents of all kinds, and which can vary in intensity; the less *"presentedness"* possessed by a content, the more *"past"* it appears. When a content is initially experienced it possesses maximum *"presentedness"*; representations of this same content occurring in subsequent phenomenal presents possess steadily decreasing intensities of *"presentedness"*, and consequently appear to be sinking into the past. But all this is mere stipulation. Broad nowhere explains how a presently occurring property of a phenomenal content can have the effect of making the relevant content seem as though it is occurring in the past, and in the absence of such an explanation there is no reason to suppose his later conception of the phenomenal present is viable.<2>

Of course, it may be possible to do better. Gallagher argues that Husserl's mature theory, correctly interpreted, is a distinct improvement on Broad's - for reasons that will emerge, I have my doubts. But there is a more general point, of a methodological nature, that is well worth noting. The anti-realist can argue thus:

"Yes, the problem of the phenomenal present is hard; it isn't easy to understand how what appear to be direct experiences of temporally extended happenings could in reality be momentary

apprehensions of momentary contents. Nonetheless, can we be certain that contents of this sort are "logically" impossible?"

I suspect not; the fact that it is hard for us to understand how something is possible doesn't mean that it isn't possible. And, as noted, earlier, there is a real (phenomenological) sense in which the anti-realist's momentary representations "would" be temporally extended. Consequently, anti-realist accounts of the phenomenal present cannot be ruled out solely on the grounds that they posit a process which is beyond our ability to comprehend. However, such a theory will always remain at a distinct disadvantage when compared with a "realist" theory that also proves adequate to the phenomenological data. Since the latter will account for experiences of change and persistence in terms of experiential phenomena that are themselves temporally extended, there will be no need to posit the remarkable transformatory process required by the anti-realist, the process which generates experiences of duration out of durationless experiences. Theories which posit unnecessary "entities" are vulnerable to Occam's Razor, but so too are theories which posit unnecessary "processes". The lesson could not be clearer: other things being equal, realist theories should be preferred on grounds of simplicity alone.

We are now in a position to be able to sort out a couple of terminological tangles. Gallagher says: "Broad, insofar as he thinks of phenomenal content as sense-data, is what Dainton defines as an anti-realist in both his early and his late accounts" (2003, sec.2). As should now be clear, this is not the case. At the start of chapter 5 I defined "realism" and "anti-realism" in the ways just outlined: in terms of differing conceptions of the nature of "the phenomenal present", not competing conceptions of "perception" (earlier, in chapter 1, I contrasted naive realist with "projectivist" theories of perception).<3> By these lights, Broad's later account is anti-realist, but his earlier account is clearly realist. In both theories he subscribed (or so it seems) to a representational or sense-data theory of perception, but in the early theory he held that we are directly aware of past and present sense-data, whereas in the later account he held that we are not directly aware of past sense-data, but rather, representations of them.

Gallagher also suggests that when discussing temporal experience, I use "phenomenal contents" to refer to "the object" (e.g. a musical tone) "as I experience it", rather than ... sense-data". Again, this is a misunderstanding. It is true that I use "phenomenal contents" to refer to objects as we experience them, but as someone who subscribes to the representational (or projectivist) theory of perception, I regard these objects as (in effect) collections of sense-data! Of course, those who subscribe to direct realist theories of perception will insist that in ordinary perceptual experience we are directly aware of the physical things in our surroundings - at any given instant, at least - and much of what I say in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is compatible with this alternative construal of "phenomenal content".

I will bring these preliminaries to a close with a few words on the two "Lotzean assumptions" that Gallagher introduces and refers to throughout his discussion:

LA1: The perception of succession requires a momentary and indivisible, and therefore durationless act of consciousness.

LA2: A sequence or succession is represented by persisting sensations or memory images that are simultaneous in present consciousness.

Gallagher suggests that Broad subscribed to LA2 in both his early and later theories, and that my interpretation of Broad "overlooks an important point about this assumption. It has to do with the nature of the contents that according to Broad and LA2 continue to persist even after the event to which they correspond." (2003, sec.2) These contents are sense-data, and "actual sense-data, generated in past experience, persist in present consciousness along with actual sense-data generated in present experience." (*ibid*)

Broad was certainly working within the framework of a sense-data theory of perception, and I agree that I should have made this absolutely plain. However, I wonder whether talking in terms of sense-data (or sensations) "persisting" in present consciousness is the best way to characterize Broad's earlier account, or "realist" theories of time-consciousness generally. Suppose I have a momentary act of awareness with extended content C-D (a succession of auditory sensations). What I hear is C-being-followed-by-D, and Broad would say that this extended content is sensed together, as a temporally extended whole, by a momentary (or brief) act. He would not want to say that I experience first C, and then D "and" C (or, C and then D-accompanied-by-a-continuation-of-C). Although D is apprehended as following on from C, C is not apprehended as "continuing on" while D is being experienced. LA2 (and Gallagher's subsequent glosses on it) is more appropriate to "anti-realist" ways of accommodating PSA. For the later Broad, C does 'persist' after it has occurred: a representation of C is experienced simultaneously with D.

What would a formulation of LA2 that remains faithful to the idea underlying PSA while remaining neutral between realist and anti-realist accounts of temporal experience look like? Perhaps this is closer to what is required:

LA2*: A sequence or succession is experienced only when a temporal spread of content is apprehended together in consciousness.

Note the substitution of "together" for the potentially misleading "simultaneous". The 'temporal spread of content' should be construed as neutral between theories of perception (so the content could be phenomenal or physical), and realist and anti-realist conceptions of the phenomenal present (what is apprehended could be real contents distributed over an interval of time, or merely representations of the latter). If we then combine LA1 and LA2* we arrive at what might prove to be a passable general characterization of PSA:

PSA: A sequence or succession is experienced only when a temporal spread of content is apprehended together in a single momentary act of consciousness.

But irrespective of how the idea underlying PSA is formulated, it remains the case that accounts of temporal experience based on this idea are problematic, for the reasons sketched out above. Hence the need to consider other options.

3. THE OVERLAP MODEL AND THE A-THEORY

The overlap model takes its name from a simple way of surmounting the problem of repeated contents within the framework of realism. Suppose I hear a sequence of tones, C-D-E-F-G; let us further suppose that the duration of these tones is such that only two can be apprehended together in a single phenomenal present - and hence, still assuming the A-theory, by a single act of awareness. Now consider act A1 which apprehends C-D, and the slightly later act A2 which apprehends D-E. If, like Broad, we hold that these two acts are entirely distinct, then each corresponds with a distinct experience, and we have the problem of repeated contents: D is experienced twice over. However, as John Foster noted (1982), if hold that the two acts overlap to exactly the same extent as their contents, there is no longer a problem with repeated contents. What we have is a temporally extended act, with two temporally extended and partially overlapping phases, which we can call A1* and A2*; A1* apprehends C-D, A2* apprehends D-E, and the sub-phase of A1* which apprehends D is numerically identical with the sub-phase of A2* which apprehends D. By virtue of this identity, D is experienced only once. Of course, for the overlap theory to be an intelligible option we must abandon the doctrine that temporal spreads of content are apprehended by *durationless* acts, but in the absence of any compelling reason to suppose the latter doctrine must be true, this seems a perfectly acceptable price to pay.

So far so good. But Gallagher sees a difficulty: he calls it the "problem of ongoing contents". In the diagram he supplies as an illustration of the overlap theory (see Figure 4), three partially overlapping extended acts e1, e2 and e3 apprehend three partially overlapping contents, A-B-C, B-C-D and C-D-E respectively. Consider C, which we can suppose is a very brief tone, which occurs right at the end of e1.

Figure 4

Gallagher's depiction of the overlap model.

Gallagher assumes that the extended acts e1, e2 and e3 are each two seconds long, and tone C is half a second or less. Gallagher claims "If content C is presented at the end of e1, it is speciously present throughout e1" (2003, sec.4) What goes for e1 also goes for e2 and e3: C is experienced in exactly the same way - as fully present - throughout these acts too. Consequently, and very bizarrely, C start to be experienced (at least) a second and a half before it occurs, and will continue to be experienced, in exactly the same way, a second and a half after it has occurred. Thus a content lasting half a second or less would be experienced for a full four seconds! This clearly absurd; our experience is manifestly not like this. Gallagher suggests that for the overlap theory to be viable, it will need to be supplemented with analogs of Husserl's "retentions" and "protentions", i.e., a doctrine of temporal modes of presentation. If we suppose that C is apprehended as "just about to occur" (or protended) prior to its occurrence, and apprehended (or retained) as "just past", or "sinking into the past", after its occurrence, we avoid the obviously unrealistic result that C is experienced as being fully present throughout e1, e2 and e3.

It may be that a doctrine of temporal modes of presentation will need to be added to the overlap model in order to secure phenomenological adequacy - I will return to this point in due course - but such an addition is not required to solve Gallagher's problem of ongoing contents, for the simple reason that there is no such problem. Gallagher has misunderstood the way the overlap model is supposed to work. But his misunderstanding is instructive.

Gallagher notes that I hold the overlap model to conform with what Miller calls the *Principle of Presentational Concurrence*, or PPC, according to which:

"the duration of a *content* being presented is *concurrent* with the duration of the *act* of presenting it. That is, the time interval occupied by a content which is before the mind is the very same as the time interval which is occupied by the act of presenting that very content before the mind." (1984, 107)

The overlap model, as presented by Gallagher, *combines* PPC with PSA. The experiencing of the succession A-B-C involves the extended act e1, which runs concurrently with A-B-C. But Gallagher also supposes that each momentary phase of this extended act apprehends a two second long stretch of content - hence the diagonal lines in his diagram. The problem of ongoing contents is the product of the (absurd) union of PPC with PSA. The overlap model, at least as I intended it to be understood, involves embracing PPC but *rejecting* PSA. Removing the diagonals from Gallagher's diagram gives the correct picture: brief act-phases are only aware of correspondingly brief content-phases, no act is aware of a stretch of content lasting longer than itself - and so no problem with ongoing contents.

When introducing the overlap model, in section 7.1 of *SoC*, I simply took it for granted that PSA and PPC were opposing principles, that if an account of the temporal characteristics of experience conformed to PPC it would not conform to PSA, and vice versa. But I did not explicitly say as much, at least initially. I only drew attention to the conflict when arguing for the redundancy of the A-theory: "since the overlap theory turns out to conform to PPC, it is clear that the posited acts of awareness are doing no work whatsoever in explaining *temporal* awareness. Specifically, we no longer need to posit acts whose contents last longer than the acts themselves, contents which are apprehended together at a single moment in time." (166) Given the way I made the point, it may be that Gallagher took the A-theory version of the overlap model to include PPC and PSA, and the overlap theory *minus* the A-theory (the "Simple overlap model" I subsequently endorse) to be committed only to PPC.

But it may also be that Gallagher's misinterpretation of the overlap model in its A-theoretic guise has an additional, deeper, and more

legitimate source: the puzzling character of the phenomenal present. Consider again the temporal spread of content A-B-C in Figure 4. We are supposing, in line with the overlap model and the A-thesis, that this content is apprehended by a continuous act of awareness e1. We are also supposing that the experience of this spread of content constitutes a phenomenal present, and so the succession A-B-C is apprehended together, as a single whole - if it were not so apprehended, we would not be directly experiencing the sequence A-B-C, and by hypothesis this sequence "is" directly experienced. But how is any of this possible? How can temporally extended phenomena be apprehended as extended wholes in this manner? What, precisely, is the relationship between temporally extended contents and the temporally extended phenomenal presents within which they are experienced?

When expounding the overlap model in its A-theoretic guise, I did not raise this question, and so did not offer a solution to it - the solution I offer only emerges in subsequent sections, when I discuss the overlap in the context of the Simple Conception of the structure of consciousness. This may explain why Gallagher assumed PSA was still in force, along with PPC, in the initial version of the overlap model, for of course, PSA "does" provide an answer to this question, albeit one which is incompatible with PPC.

I will be considering the structure and makeup of the phenomenal present shortly, but there is another matter to be dealt with first. The (pseudo-) problem of ongoing contents is the most serious of Gallagher's objections to the overlap model, but there are others. In its A-theoretic guise, the overlap model requires overlapping acts of awareness, and overlapping contents. Gallagher is sceptical on both counts. He writes:

"I don't think [Dainton] actually means overlapping contents (p. 164). An example of an overlapping content would be if I am looking at someone as they tell me their account of consciousness and the phone rings. I see them, I hear them, and I hear the phone. This kind of thing happens constantly and is phenomenologically unproblematic, although it may be pragmatically problematic. It's not just one damn thing after another (as Whitehead once said in regard to experience) it's too many things at once. Rather than overlapping contents, I think Dainton means overlapping specious presents" (2003, section 4)

I do think specious presents can overlap, but I also believe phenomenal contents can, both at a time and over time. Gallagher, it seems, prefers to reserve "overlapping contents" for distinct simultaneous contents that are experienced together (or are co-conscious). More generally, his example is an instance of what we might call "overlap by superposition", a way of overlapping that involves two distinct things sharing a common location - where "location" is construed liberally. Placemats stacked on top of one another overlap in this way, by occupying, partially or completely, the same place on the tabletop. Gallagher's example involves two distinct phenomenal contents that are co-located in virtue of occurring simultaneously in the same consciousness. Overlap by superposition is a real phenomenon, but there is clearly another form of overlapping, a form which does not involve numerically distinct things occupying the same location. We can call the phenomenon I have in mind "overlap by virtue of having parts in common". Consider the temporal periods P1 = 1850-1950 and P2 = 1900-2000. P1 and P2 overlap, but not in the manner of placemats lying on top of one another. Although P1 and P2 have parts which are co-located, the parts in question are numerically identical: P1 contains the period 1900-1950, as does P2. The contents of acts of awareness e1 and e2 in Figure 4 overlap in precisely the same fashion: e1 apprehends A-B-C, and e2 apprehends B-C-D, and the "BC" in the latter is numerically identical with the "BC" in the former.

Figure 5

Two forms of overlap. On the left, three disks (seen from the edge on) partially overlap by virtue of having parts which are vertically aligned. On the right, A and B partially overlap by virtue of possessing a common part - the blue region.

Similar considerations apply to Gallagher's difficulties with the idea of overlapping acts of awareness:

"I'm not sure what overlapping acts of awareness could mean for an individual subject. I can conceive of a temporal overlap of two or more acts of awareness in the following way. I'm sitting in my office looking at the ringing phone, for example. You walk in, hand me a piece of paper, glance at the ringing phone, and walk out. Your awareness of the ringing phone temporally and temporarily overlapped with mine. Can something like this overlap happen in one individual?" (2003, section 4)

Again, the case Gallagher finds unobjectionable is an instance of overlap by superposition, albeit with a difference: the two subjects are not only having experiences at the same time, they are also aware of the same (physical) object. The kind of overlap I had in mind - a form which can occur within the consciousness of one individual - involves overlap by virtue of having parts in common. Look again at Figure 4: e1, e2 and e3 are acts of awareness which overlap in just this way. Or at least, that is how the diagram "should" be interpreted. The different "heights" assigned to e1, e2 and e3 should not be taken to mean these acts are entirely distinct, they aren't, they share common parts. I can see no harm in using "overlap" to refer to these different sorts of case, provided it is clear just what "kind" of overlap is involved in each particular instance.

4. THE OVERLAP MODEL, THE SIMPLE CONCEPTION, AND THE PHENOMENAL PRESENT

PSA presupposes the awareness-content model of consciousness; if a viable account of time-consciousness required PSA, then the A-thesis would stand vindicated. But the reverse seems true: as we have seen, there are good reasons for thinking that PSA is an "obstacle" to the construction of a viable account of time-consciousness. For this reason, bearing in mind the various criticisms that can

be directed against the A-thesis in the context of the synchronic unity of consciousness (see *SoC* 2.4-2.7), there appear to be no good reasons for retaining the awareness-content model in the context of diachronic experiential unity. According to what I call the "Simple overlap model", the unity of consciousness over time is a product of inter-experiential relations among partially overlapping phases of a stream of consciousness. On this "Simple Conception" of consciousness, streams of experience are entirely composed of interrelated phenomenal contents, and these contents do not need to fall under a separate act of awareness in order to be conscious. Phenomenal contents, thus construed, are intrinsically conscious entities.

Gallagher lodges a number of complaints against the overlap model in its Simple form, and I will deal with these shortly. I want first to return to some unfinished business from the preceding section, concerning the structure and composition of phenomenal presents. Now that we are working within the framework of the Simple Conception of consciousness the issue can be formulated thus: How do the contents in a single phenomenal present come to be experienced as a unified whole if they are not apprehended by a single act of awareness of the sort posited by advocates of PSA? The answer, I suggest, is that the contents in question are related by *co-consciousness*, the same primitive inter-experiential relationship that is responsible for the unity of consciousness at a given time. Just as all the constituent parts of a spatial field of content can be directly co-conscious, so too can all the constituent parts of a *temporal* field of content. In both cases, the contents in question are experienced together, as a unified ensemble, but whereas in the former case the contents are distributed through space, in the latter case they are distributed over time.

By invoking *diachronic* co-consciousness in this manner, there is no need to introduce a separate (momentary) act of awareness to bind the constituents of phenomenal presents into experienced unities, inter-experiential relations suffice. There is, however, one significant difference between synchronic and diachronic co-consciousness. Suppose that at a certain moment I have three simultaneous experiences: I see a flash of light (A), hear a noise (B) and feel a twinge of pain (C). Let us further suppose (as would almost certainly be the case) that (A) and (B) are experienced together, likewise (B) and (C). If these interexperiential relations hold, would it not also be the case that (A) and (C) are also experienced together? It seems likely. Indeed, it is very hard to see how (A) and (C) could possibly fail to be co-conscious. Hence co-consciousness, in the synchronic case, looks to be a transitive relation (cf. *SoC* chapter 4). The diachronic case is clearly different in this regard. Transitivity does hold within the brief confines of a single phenomenal present, but not over the longer term. It is perfectly possible for a succession of experiences to be such that X is co-conscious with Y, Y is co-conscious with Z and X is not co-conscious with Z. This type of structure is characteristic of our experience of temporality: things enter our consciousness, pass through (or so it seems), and then depart from it, making way for new contents. If transitivity were not confined in this manner, all the contents of an uninterrupted stream of consciousness, from start to finish, would be mutually co-conscious. There may be some beings whose consciousness takes this form, but ours clearly does not. The fact that transitivity - in our case at least - extends such a short way through time condemns us to experiencing the world through the narrow window of our phenomenal presents. Of course, it is not a coincidence that the limits of transitivity and the boundaries of phenomenal presents coincide. A phenomenal present is a unified phenomenal expanse - its earlier and later parts are experienced together - and for an experience to be thus its constituents must be transitively co-conscious.

In the synchronic case, co-consciousness is not only transitive, it is also *pervasive*. Take a brief (or momentary) temporal slice of a stream of consciousness, and you will typically find that every part of this slice is co-conscious with every other part, and that this is so irrespective of the way in which the whole is decomposed into parts. See Figure 6.

Figure 6

The circle represents a momentary (or very brief) phase of a stream of consciousness. The double-headed lines represent relations of co-consciousness connecting distinct regions of this total state of consciousness. Only a small and arbitrary fraction of these relations are shown. Since a phase of a stream of consciousness can be divided into regions in different ways, and every region - no matter how small or large - is co-conscious with every other region, if all the relations of co-consciousness were shown in the same way, the result would be the picture on the right.

Diachronic co-consciousness works in the same manner, connecting each and every part of a single phenomenal present (cf. *SoC*, 172). This is illustrated in Figure 7, where each rectangle represents a single phenomenal present.

Figure 7

Diachronic co-consciousness in a single phenomenal present. Partially depicted (upper); fully depicted (lower).

The parts of a phenomenal present may be mutually co-conscious, but they are not experienced as simultaneous, for as already noted, a typical phenomenal present is a temporal field of content, e.g. a transition between two brief tones, or one tone enduring, or the seeing of a car in motion, or a combination of suchlike. But although the constituents of a phenomenal present are not experienced as simultaneous, there is also a sense in which they are all experienced as *present*. This may seem paradoxical, but appearances can be deceptive, and this is a case in point. Some parts of a phenomenal present are earlier than others, but the earlier parts do not possess an intrinsic property (or temporal mode of presentation) which marks them out as such - it is in this sense that they are all experienced as "present", and this is a key difference between the overlap theory and typical anti-realisms, such as those of Broad and Husserl. If the experienced succession C-D-E includes two phenomenal presents [C-D] and [D-E], the intrinsic properties of D are the same in both (if they were not, the D in the first phenomenal present could not be numerically identical with the D in the second).

A further issue now comes to the fore. If contents all appear equally present as and when they occur, what accounts for the experienced *direction* or *order* that most phenomenal contents exhibit? The difficulty is all the more pressing because co-consciousness is symmetrical: if C is co-conscious with D, then D is co-conscious with C. The solution, I suggest, is phenomenal *character*. Phenomenal contents are not just temporally extended, they also inherently dynamic, they possess a *flowing* character - this flow-character is an intrinsic phenomenal attribute, just like colour or timbre. It is because each of C, D and E possesses this immanent directed animation that C is experienced as flowing into D, and D into E. I stress again that we dealing here with only brief intervals, of around a second or less (cf. *SoC*, 131) - the overlap model is only intended as an account of our short-term, moment-to-moment, experience of temporality.

But then, it is this aspect of our overall experience of time that is by far the most puzzling.<5>

This account of the phenomenal present differs from that offered by Broad and Husserl (at least in their anti-realist periods). Is there anything to prevent an anti-realist rejecting the notion that as contents slip through the phenomenal present they undergo qualitative modifications, modifications which make it seem as though the contents are slipping into the past? I cannot see that there is. But an anti-realism which combined the overlap model's conception of the phenomenal present with the doctrine that new phenomenal presents are continually being generated, from moment to moment, would be vulnerable to the problem of repeated contents that sunk Broad's realist theory. The overlap theory itself, of course, entirely avoids this difficulty.

Gallagher rightly takes me to task for not having provided a diagram illustrating how the overlap model is supposed to work. His own Figure 2 looks to be along the right lines, but it is possible to go a little further.

Figure 8

An "exploded" depiction of a short stream of consciousness displaying two of the structural elements of phenomenal temporality.

A stream of consciousness consists of partially overlapping phenomenal presents. Only three of the latter are shown in Figure 8; in reality, even for a stream as brief as this one, there would be a good many more - successive phenomenal presents being separated by just-noticeable temporal differences. The lower of the two expansions represents the manner in which the parts of the various phenomenal presents are linked by diachronic co-consciousness. The successive phenomenal presents partially overlap by sharing parts or phases, but not for long: thanks to the fact that the relation of diachronic co-consciousness is only transitive for short periods, experiences separated by more than the length of the phenomenal present are not experienced together. The same three phenomenal presents are shown in the upper expansion, the single-headed arrows show the direction in which experience seems to be flowing, this apparent directedness is a consequence of the "contents" of the phenomenal presents; these contents have the form of temporal fields or spreads of content possessing inherent directedness or "flow" (e.g. a ball moving to the right).

So much for the basic picture.<6> Gallagher lodges several objections against the Simple overlap model, some conceptual, some phenomenological. If these objections could not be met, the theory would certainly be in serious trouble - it might even be sunk!

5. THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF OVERLAP

On the conceptual side, the first complaint is that the rejection of the A-thesis "robs PPC of any meaning". I stated that "although [when discussing the Simple overlap model] I shall still refer to PPC, the latter principle should no longer be taken to imply the validity of the act-object model" (2000, 166) Gallagher is right to point out that since PPC is defined in terms of the A-thesis, it is not clear how it could have any sense once the A-thesis has been rejected! But even if the lettering needs amending, the spirit of PPC can certainly live on in the new framework, the relevant claim being that our consciousness of temporally extended contents runs concurrently with the contents, rather than being condensed into shorter-lasting apprehensions. And of course, the Simple overlap theory delivers precisely this result: there is no longer any distinction between consciousness and content (contents are intrinsically conscious), and since these inherently conscious contents are temporally extended, consciousness and content cannot fail to run concurrently.

The second complaint is potentially more threatening. Gallagher alleges that the holistic character of consciousness renders my notion of overlapping experiences incoherent. He formulates the objection thus:

"If e1, an ongoing experience, is suddenly overlapped by e2, then my overall consciousness would have a different character and it would not be a case of e2 overlapping with e1, but e1 being *replaced* by e2 (the effect of combining e1 and e2). That is, a new experience rather than two overlapping experiences would occur, because overlapping experiences cannot retain their individual phenomenal characters. When they are in sync, one sinks into the other and something new surfaces." (2002, section 4)

I am uncertain as to the kind of overlap Gallagher has in mind here. Is it a case of straightforward temporal overlap, as occurs when two successive phenomenal presents share a common part, e.g. [e1-e2], [e2-e3]? Or, alternatively, is it a case in which the so-called "overlap" involves two numerically distinct experiences occurring simultaneously? The latter sort of case can be represented thus:

e1-e1-e1/e2

Here, the "/" indicates co-conscious simultaneity, and as can be seen, a persisting e1-type experience comes to be accompanied by an e2-type experience. Bearing in mind the earlier discussion concerning the use of "overlap", I suspect it is the latter sort of case that Gallagher has in mind - certainly his claim that "when they are in sync, one sinks into the other and something quite new surfaces" suggests as much. But it does not really matter, for so far as I can see, neither type of case poses any serious problems for the overlap theory.

There are different kinds of experiential holism. First, the entirely innocuous case in which the character (and so identity) of an experiential whole depends upon its constituent parts. In the case of W1 = [C, D, E] and W2 = [C, D, F], W1 and W2 are (we can suppose) two experiences in their own right, complex experiences consisting of simultaneous co-conscious parts (C, D, etc.). As is obvious, W1 and W2 are distinct experiences because they have different constituent parts.<7> The more interesting forms of holism are cases in which the phenomenal characters of the "parts" of experiential wholes are affected by the other experiences in the whole (i.e., by the experiences with which they are co-conscious). In chapters 8 and 9 of *SoC* I distinguished several forms of "phenomenal

interdependence", different ways in which the character of an experiential whole can impact on the intrinsic phenomenal character of its parts. Although I argued that phenomenal interdependence might well be less pervasive than some have imagined, I acknowledged that it does occur. In chapter 9, I argued that a quite different form of inter-experiential holism obtains, one grounded in inter-experiential relations. I suggested that in addition to their "local" intrinsic properties, experiences also have "global" phenomenal properties; an experience's global properties are determined by the other experiences with which it is co-conscious. In a simple case, if e1 is co-conscious with e2, a complete characterization of e1 would include the fact that e1 is co-conscious with an e2-type experience, and vice versa. There are further complications, e.g. concerning type versus token holism, but these are not relevant to the current issue.

Let us first consider the sort of case which I suspect is worrying Gallagher, a case of the sort: [e1-e1/e2], i.e. where a new experience is added to a persisting experience. Gallagher suggests that in such a case, the final phase of e1 would cease to exist, and be replaced by a numerically distinct experience, thus: [e1-e1*/e2]. Although I am far from certain that the "local" intrinsic character of e1 would be affected by virtue of the fact that it is experienced simultaneously with e2, I have no doubt that its "global" character would be, and so I would agree with Gallagher that this fact ought to be registered. Indeed, in sections 9.2 and 9.4 of *SoC* I suggested some ways in which this could be done. My only quibble is with the way Gallagher formulates the point. Saying that e1 is "replaced" by a different experience e1* could easily be misconstrued; e1* does not push e1 out of the way, as it were; what we have is simply a succession of e1-type phases that terminates in an e1*-type experience (and the latter is simultaneous and co-conscious with an e2-type experience). This point aside, so far as I can see, Gallagher and I are in full agreement on the essentials. What I find puzzling is why Gallagher believes any of this threatens the intelligibility of the kinds of relationship between experiences that the overlap model requires. In the case of [e1-e1*/e2], all the overlap model requires is that (a) e1* be co-conscious with e2, and (b) e1 be co-conscious with both e1* and e2. The obtaining of these inter-experiential relationships is quite compatible with the fact that the phenomenal character of e1* would be different were it not co-conscious with e2. Experiential overlap involves experiences being experienced together; the fact that the experiences in question are interdependent at the level of phenomenal character is no obstacle whatsoever to their being experienced together, or their overlapping.

What of the second sort of case, where the overlap occurs over time? Precisely the same considerations apply. In the simple example [e1-e2], [e2-e3], the e2-token in the earlier phenomenal present is numerically identical with the e2-token in the later phenomenal present. If the character of e2 is holistically bound up with e1 and/or e3, then we simply suppose that the difference being co-conscious with e1 and/or e3 makes to e2 is built into the phenomenal character that e2 actually has. Once again, phenomenal interdependence, whether local or global, is no barrier to experiences being related by co-consciousness, and hence to temporally extended experiences partially overlapping.

This said, there is something potentially puzzling about diachronic overlap, and it may be that the issue I have in mind is the underlying source of some of Gallagher's misgivings about the very possibility of overlap. In my analysis of global phenomenal character and succession (*SoC*, 9.4, 9.5) I argue that the global character of e2 is (roughly) of the form "An e2-type experience that is co-conscious with an earlier e1-type experience and a later e3-type experience". This may seem puzzling. How is it possible for e2 to have a phenomenal character which is influenced by e3, given that when e2 occurs e3 still lies in the future? One sort of influence is unproblematic: the overall character of my experience when e2 occurs may well be affected by the ways I *anticipate* my experience unfolding in the immediate future. Since the phenomenological effects of anticipation occur simultaneously with e2, they are unproblematic. The situation is different with regard to e2's "global" character, which, as already noted, includes a component of the form "is co-conscious with an e3-type experience". How could e2 have a phenomenal character of this sort before e3 has occurred? But there is no real problem here either. The token e2 is a part of two partially overlapping temporally extended total experiences, [e1-e2] and [e2-e3], and the global properties it has simply reflect this fact. In saying that e2 has the global property "is co-conscious with an e3-type experience" we are not ascribing some intrinsic (local) feature to e2 which the latter could not possibly possess when e3 has yet to happen. On the contrary, this global property essentially involves both e2 and e3, and e2 only possesses it because, in actual fact, it is a component of the experience [e2-e3]. If all times are equally real, then e2 (tenselessly) possesses all its global properties at all times. If, on the other hand, future events are not real as of present events, then the global properties of experiences will evolve with the passage of time (or the absolute growth of the universe). As of the time e2 comes into being, it possesses the global property of being co-conscious with an earlier e1-type experience, and that is all; a few moments later, as of the time when e3 comes into being, e2 also possesses the global property of being co-conscious with a later e3-type property. It may seem strange to suppose that the relational properties of a particular can evolve in this way over time, but any peculiarity is due to the model of time that is being assumed here, it has nothing to do with the nature of the inter-experiential relations involved.<8>

6. PHENOMENOLOGICAL ADEQUACY: THE OVERLAP MODEL AUGMENTED

Moving on to Gallagher's phenomenological objections, he states:

if I try to find overlapping experiences phenomenologically, it seems just as problematic as trying to find reified retentions and protentions appearing in the flow. Dainton's criticism of Husserl seems to apply equally to his own analysis in this regard. Perhaps my defense of Husserl would work equally as a defense of Dainton: overlapping experiences are simply descriptive abstractions. In contrast to Husserl's description, however, according to which I can say that when I hear a piece of music my experience is that I seem to retain the sense of previous notes in the melody and anticipate what is to come next, I find it difficult to say that when I hear a piece of music the current note seems to overlap with previous and future

notes. In the overlap model, for example, it's not clear why, in a sequence of auditory experiences (or phases of experience) a1- a2- a3-a4, the fact that experience a3 is just prior to a4, or that there is an overlap between a2- a3 and a3- a4, explains or describes anything about the phenomenal character of anticipating the continuing melody at any moment of the experience. (2003, section 4)

One of Gallagher's concerns here is that he cannot detect any overlapping of experiences within his own consciousness. I suspect Gallagher's worry may stem from his construing overlap in terms of superposition, rather than its being a matter of possession of common parts.

Figure 9

If we construe overlap in the way depicted on the left of Figure 9, then in experiencing a succession A-B-C, the two overlapping phenomenal presents contain "two" instances of a B-tone: A-B/B*-C. It is true that this "doubling" is not a ubiquitous feature of our ordinary experience, and perhaps could not be - if we suppose B and B* are qualitatively identical, the experience of B/B* might well be indiscernible from the experience of B or B* alone. However, as should by now be clear, the "overlap" in the overlap model is of the kind shown on the right in Figure 9: overlap by sharing of common parts. Consequently, suspect superpositions of the sort shown on the left do not occur, or at least, they are not inevitable products of the kind of experiential structure which overlap theorists use in their account of temporal experience.

Of course, the question remains: does the sort of overlap shown on the right have a discernible phenomenological character? The answer is unambiguously "Yes". Suppose you hear a succession A-B-C; you hear A-running-into-B, and B-running-into-C. Since you hear [B] only once, we can immediately conclude that the experiencing of [B] in the earlier phenomenal present is numerically identical with the experiencing of [B] in the later phenomenal present, and hence that you have just experienced two phenomenal presents that overlapped by virtue of possessing a common part. This identity not just a reasonable inference, it is directly apprehended: the [B] that you experience [A] running-into is one and the same experience as the [B] that you experience running-into [C]. This overlap structure is not, I concede, immediately obvious. We find it most natural to think of ourselves as simply experiencing A-flowing-into-B-flowing-into-C. The fact that this extended experience consists of overlapping phenomenal presents only becomes apparent after some reflection and introspective experimentation, but once thus equipped, the existence of overlap-structures within our ordinary experience becomes obvious. More generally, if we accept the overlap model, then we are all continually aware of experiential overlaps, for it is these overlaps which are directly responsible for the "experienced" continuity of our streams of consciousness. These overlaps do not produce noticeable alterations in experience of the sort Gallagher seems to require - and which might naively be expected if distinct experiences could overlap in the manner of sheets of glass, which when overlapping affect the appearance of what can be seen through them - but, as I hope is now very clear, the overlap model does not posit "this" sort of overlap.

Gallagher has a second complaint. When listening to a familiar melody we do not just experience a sequence of notes; our consciousness is usually a good deal richer. We are aware "that" the melody is familiar, that we have heard it before; also, as it unfolds we have a continually updated sense of how much has gone, and how much is still to come, and in many cases we have an awareness of the notes which have already occurred, and those which will occur next. What goes for the simple case of a melody applies also to our experience more generally, e.g. for visual inspection of a familiar painting. This additional complexity is explained by Husserl, who holds that immediate experience is accompanied by a system of backward-looking "retentions" and forward-looking "protentions". The explanatory resources of the overlap theory, by contrast, are impoverished, and as a result it is incapable of accounting for our experience of temporality in its full richness and complexity.

To this charge I plead guilty. The overlap theory only offers an account of the most elementary aspect of temporal experience, the immediate experience of change and duration in sensory experience, over short intervals of time. There are, of course, additional ingredients or levels in our everyday experience of temporality, some of which are mentioned by Gallagher. But then, I did not claim to be providing a complete account of time-consciousness, in all its multi-faceted complexity. As I indicated right at the outset ("SoC", pp.xv-xvi), I was attempting only to provide an account of the most basic structures of streams of consciousness, structures that might also be found in creatures not equipped with conceptual abilities, creatures whose consciousness is restricted to sensory experience of the most basic kinds. But with the benefit of hindsight, I see that it would have been useful to the reader to reiterate this point in chapter 7, so as to make it clear just what the overlap theory was supposed to be a theory "of".

The non-elementary aspects of temporal experience do not pose a problem for the overlap theory, for so far as I can see, they can easily be accommodated within its confines. Attempting a reasonably complete characterization of phenomenal temporality in all its forms is a decidedly non-trivial task, and this is not the place for such an attempt. But a fuller account would include at least the following:

(A) Elementary Aspects:

- (A1) Temporally extended contents animated by immanent phenomenal flow.
- (A2) Overlapping phenomenal presents; the non-transitivity of diachronic co-consciousness.
- (A3) Temporal modes of presentation due to the (diachronic) global properties of adjoining stream-phases.

(B) Non-Elementary Aspects:

- (B1) Conscious thoughts and conscious acts.
- (B2) Memory and imagination.
- (B3) Non-sensory "fringe" consciousness

Enough has been said already about the various components of the overlap model, as summarized under (A), so I will say a little about how the sorts of item falling under (B) stand with respect to the base level.

While listening to a melody various conscious thoughts might pass through my mind. Many of these might well be about matters quite unconnected with the melody, others will be such as to provide me a broader temporal context for the current experience - e.g. "When I did I last hear this? Ah yes, it was on holiday last year, that night when the storm hit". Thoughts of this ilk contribute to my "experience of time" in a broad sense of the term: rather than being responsible for the moment-to-moment continuity of my phenomenal consciousness, they provide me with a cognitive fix on how my current experience fits into my life as a whole. Such thoughts are easily accommodated in the overlap theory, for they are merely contents in the stream of consciousness, and when temporally extended (some thoughts appear momentary, or close to it) they are distributed across overlapping phenomenal presents in precisely the same way as extended sensory contents.

The same holds for all "conscious acts", by which I mean volitions (making a decision, consciously exerting one's will) mental activities (such as adding up numbers in one's head), wishing, hoping, fearing and the like. All mental processes with discernible phenomenological characteristics have the same status: they are contents occurring in streams of consciousness, and their successive phases unfold across partially overlapping phenomenal presents. Rejecting the A-thesis in favour of the Simple Conception does not mean denying the existence of conscious acts of this kind.<9>

Memory makes its own distinctive contributions too. We have just encountered one: conscious thoughts about the past are one of the ways memories make themselves felt. But memory also allows us to "replay" past experiences we have had, and these sensory reproductions can accompany our present sensory experience. Sometimes the replay is involuntary: if a loud bang disrupts my snoozing, I might find reproductions of the sound reverberating in my consciousness for the next few seconds, without my consciously triggering the recollections. But in other cases the reproduction is voluntary. As I hear a melody unfold I might also be "listening" to remembered (or imagined) fragments of it in my acoustic imagination; these sensory memories - which may well present condensed, accelerated, versions of the actual melody - provide me with a richer awareness of the past and future course of my experience than I would otherwise have. In cases such as this, the memory images or sequences are experiences in their own right, temporally extended experiences, whose successive phases occur in partially overlapping phenomenal presents.

The third component, "fringe" consciousness, is as important as the others, but more elusive. A fringe experience - or perhaps better, the fringe "aspect" of an experience - is non-sensory, it lacks distinctive qualities of a sensory kind, but it nonetheless possesses a definite (if not always very detailed) content or meaning of its own, one which is clearly manifest in consciousness. The term "fringe" is due to William James (he also uses "halo", "psychic overtone", "feelings of tendency", "suffusion"), and is in some respects less than ideal: "intuitive feeling" is somewhat better, though the intended phenomenon is more common than the usual understanding of this phrase might lead one to suppose. Think of what it is like see someone and know that you have seen them before, but can't remember when or where: there is a strong feeling of conviction, a feeling that in itself has no sensory features, but nonetheless has a definite sense or meaning: "I've seen that person before!" The feeling of familiarity, the intuitive knowledge of already having encountered or perceived something, is a ubiquitous feature of much ordinary experience, but precisely because it *is* so common, we tend not to notice it. It is felt particularly strongly in the "I've seen that before, but where?" case because it is accompanied by, and clashes with, the inability to recollect - and the sense that there is something that one is currently unable to remember is itself an important kind of fringe feeling.<10> As is the sense of "rightness", or "right direction", the feeling that we are going about something in the correct way, that we know what we are doing or where we are going, that the task in hand is well within our capabilities, or that the solution we have just arrived at is indeed the correct one. Again, this feeling is such a familiar accompaniment to our everyday activities that often it is only rendered noticeable by its absence. We have all had the experience of the feeling of rightness fading away - as we realize that we *don't* in fact know how to proceed to our destination, or that the solution which seemed so promising may not be correct after all, and so forth.

There is a good deal more to be said about these matters - see Mangan (2001) for a good overview.<11> For present purposes, fringe experience is of interest because of the role it plays in our overall experience of temporality. Our present consciousness *is* usually infused with a sense of what has just gone, and a sense of what is about to come. Since this sense is not in itself sensory it cannot be explained solely in terms of the overlapping sensory contents, it is an additional ingredient in our consciousness of time. This additional ingredient sits easily within the framework of the overlap model. Once the existence and importance of the fringe is recognized, the forwards- and backwards- oriented aspects of consciousness in question can be seen for what they generally are: products of *present* feeling. At the purely sensory level, the experienced continuity of consciousness is produced by overlapping temporally extended experiences whose contents are inherently dynamic. This sensory continuity is typically accompanied by (or infused with) fringe feelings of rightness and familiarity, feelings which provide us with the reassuring sense that things are proceeding as they should, that how things are now is in line with how they were moments ago. If these feelings were absent, the sceptical thought "Perhaps I came into being only a moment ago!" would have rather more bite than it does.

Among the forwards-directed aspects of consciousness are anticipations, in the form of fringe-feelings as to what we are about to see, or do, or say. James is particularly good here:

"Suppose three successive persons say to us:
 "Wait!", "Hark!", "Look!" Our consciousness is
 thrown into three quite distinct attitudes of
 expectancy, although no definite object is before

it in any one of the three cases. ... leaving out the reverberating images of the three words, which are of course diverse, probably no one will deny the existence of a residual conscious affection, a sense of the direction from which an impression is about to come, although no positive impression is yet there." (1952, 162)

"... has the reader never asked himself what kind of a mental fact is his *intention of saying* a thing before he has said it? It is an entirely definite intention, distinct from all other intentions, an absolutely distinct state of consciousness, therefore; and yet how much of it consists of definite sensorial images, either of words or of things? Hardly anything! ... It has therefore a nature of its own of the most positive sort, and yet what can we say about it without using words that belong to the later mental facts that replace it? The intention *to-say-so-and-so* is the only name it can receive. One may admit that a good third of our psychic life consists in these rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of thought not yet articulate." (1952, 164)

To the rapid premonitory perspective views of "schemes of thought" we can add "schemes of perceptual experiences". The feeling of knowing what we are about to say is certainly real, but in addition, we usually have a more general feeling that we know what we are about to experience - or about what we *could* experience if we were to act appropriately (e.g., pick up the book to look inside, rather than leaving it on the shelf, as we currently intend).<12> The presence or strength of such feelings does not depend on the clarity or detail of any anticipatory sensory images we might be enjoying - such imaginings may be entirely absent - it is simply a matter of feeling confident about what we are about to see, hear or touch.

Fringe feelings are important ingredients in an adequate phenomenology of temporal experience, but their significance should not be overstated. Mangan may be guilty in this regard. It is often supposed that James employed the stream of consciousness metaphor to draw attention to the dynamic, flowing, character of our experience. Mangan suggests this is wrong, or at least, not the full story: the main purpose of the metaphor was to convey the crucial (but easily overlooked) role of fringe experience in generating the sense of continuity in consciousness. James held that in addition to the definite sensory images recognized by "traditional psychology", we must recognize the "free water of consciousness" flowing around and through them: "Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it will lead." (1952, 165) From this Mangan concludes that for James the continuity in consciousness "is established via feelings of relation and ... of tendency" (2001, 11).

Irrespective of whether Mangan correctly interprets James' intentions, it is a mistake to suppose fringe experience is entirely responsible for the continuity in consciousness - far from it. Fringe feelings accompany (or suffuse) a flow of sensation which possesses its *own* inherent continuity. Think again of listening to a melody: each note may be accompanied by a dying echo of what preceded it and a dawning sense of what will follow, but each note also has its own dynamic sonic character, each note *consists of* a flow of sensory quality, a flow which also carries one note over into its successor - and this flow could exist largely unchanged in the absence of its subtle halo of fringe feeling. Take another example: hold your hand at arms length in front of your face, and then move it quickly towards your eyes. How would the dynamics of this visual experience be different in the absence of fringe feeling? If the latter were altogether absent, would you not still see an object rushing rapidly towards you? There is an experienced continuity at the sensory level that cannot be explained in non-sensory terms, and it is this primitive form of short-term continuity that the overlap theory is intended to account for.

Rather than displacing the structures posited by the overlap model, the fringe aspects of experience are, in fact, easily accommodated within it, as shown in Figure 10. Here, the fringe feelings suffusing (or accompanying) a single phenomenal present are depicted. As can be seen, these feelings are enmeshed in a network of co-consciousness relations, and embedded in contents which are themselves animated by phenomenal flow.

Figure 10
The tri-partite structure of a single phenomenal present.

In Figure 10 I follow Mangan, and assume that fringe feelings are spread through sensory phenomenal contents (represented in this case by a green rectangle). Perhaps this is wrong; perhaps some (or even all) fringe contents are independent ingredients in consciousness, ingredients that should not be conceived as aspects of sensory contents. This could be depicted simply by removing the green rectangle from the upper right, leaving the fringe isolated. But as is clear, so far as the overlap model is concerned, the basic picture remains unchanged. It remains the case that fringe feelings, as they accompany sensory contents, are themselves extended through time and connected by overlapping chains of diachronic co-consciousness, as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11
The overlap model augmented so as to accommodate the fringe aspects of experience. Successive phenomenal presents partially overlap; fringe feelings in adjacent streamal phases are connected by diachronic co-consciousness (indicated in the lower expansion by a single double-headed line).

On a more speculative note, it may even be that the overlap model applies beyond the sphere of the sensory altogether. Although fringe experiences are usually to be found in the company of sensory contents, I have already suggested that it is possible to conceive of sensory contents flowing on in the absence of fringe feelings. Does this hold the other way about? Could there be fringe experience in the absence of sensory experience? Perhaps. At the very least, it certainly seems conceivable that there could be a stream of consciousness consisting of nothing but intuitive feelings of (say) a sense of anxiety, or contentment - even if human experience rarely (if ever) takes this form. The contents of such a stream would, it seems reasonable to suppose, possess the same continuous flowing character that feelings of anxiety or contentment have when experienced with sensory contents. These temporal characteristics can be explained in the usual way: overlapping phenomenal presents whose (non-sensory) contents possess immanent phenomenal flow.

It may even be that consciousness can come in still more unusual forms. Certain meditation-induced experiences are often described as lacking in sensory content. Assuming that these modes of consciousness have "some" phenomenal character, as I think we must - see Dainton (2002) - it may well be that they consist of nothing but fringe feelings. If so, these fringe feelings are of an unusual character: they are often described as being wholly non-temporal in phenomenal character - see Forman (1998) for some typical reports. With the materials now at our disposal we can begin to see how an "experience" of timeless emptiness might be possible. Such an experience could consist of a non-sensory fringe feeling of (say) mild wonderment or contentment (or both) that lacks the immanent flowing character that is typical of ordinary forms of experience. If experiences of this kind are possible, they too can be accommodated within the framework of the overlap model, as shown below.

Figure 12

A speculative depiction of an episode of non-sensory ("pure") consciousness, construed as one or more fringe feelings occurring in the absence of sensory contents.

Note the absence of the arrows indicating flow-character in the central (non-sensory) phase of this uninterrupted stream of experience. Even given this absence, it seems reasonable to suppose that the episode of pure consciousness is knitted to the phases of normal consciousness which precede and follow it - connected by relations of diachronic co-consciousness holding between normal and "pure fringe" experiences, in the manner shown.

7. HUSSERL

In chapter 6 of *SoC* I compare and contrast the changing views of Broad and Husserl concerning temporal awareness. I argue that whereas Broad moved from a realist to an anti-realist view, Husserl did the opposite, his later writings being decidedly more realist than his earlier ones. I suggested that these shifts in doctrine were due to the difficulty of formulating a satisfactory account of phenomenal temporality within the confines of PSA - a doctrine to which both Husserl and Broad subscribed during the relevant periods - and consequently, that we should consider rejecting this problematic principle. Gallagher argues that my story is "misleadingly neat", and he usefully indicates some of the ways in which this is so. He also provides interpretation of Husserl's more mature position, which he argues has merits which I overlooked. I will comment on the latter in the section which follows this one.

Gallagher writes: "[Dainton] contends that Broad's early view is equivalent to Husserl's later view, and Broad's later view is equivalent to Husserl's early view" (2003, section 6). I fear this overstates the clarity of my position. Being aware that differences existed, I expressed myself more cautiously, and vaguely. This said, I may well have been guilty of exaggerating the similarities, especially in my sketchy and inadequate remarks on Husserl's more mature view. Nonetheless, even if the standpoints of Broad and Husserl differ in the ways Gallagher suggests, I am not sure these differences are such as to undermine my main claim, that Broad shifted from realism towards anti-realism, whereas Husserl did the opposite. But given the difficulties Gallagher had understanding what I meant by these terms in this context, I am wary of concluding from his silence on this issue that he would agree with this verdict.

What is not in any serious doubt is that until around 1908-9 Husserl subscribed to an anti-realist view of the phenomenal present. In both his early and later writings, Husserl held that the "now-point" (or primal impression) is invariably experienced against the backdrop of "retentions" (of the just-past) and "protentions" (of what is about to occur). This tri-partite structure of retentions-primal impression-protentions was supposed to provide us with our elemental experience of time - of the differences between past, present and future, as these are manifest in consciousness. In his 1905 lectures Husserl viewed retentions as sensory contents occurring simultaneously with the present primal impression, that were "animated" (or imbued with sense) by an act of apprehension in such a way as to appear just-past. Since animated content and animating act are simultaneous, we are not directly aware of the past (or future) even though we seem to be.

The later Broad did not regard ordinary experiences as being compounds of inert, meaningless, sensory contents and animating acts of awareness. Nor did he build a future-directed, protentional, element into the phenomenal present. But in one key respect his view of the phenomenal present was similar to Husserl's: it consists of a momentary (and so simultaneous) collection of contents, which appear to stretch from the present into the recent past. And so, as with the early Husserl, the scope of direct awareness is confined to the momentary present.

Husserl himself came to recognize that his earlier (representational) anti-realist theory was problematic. In his notes for the 1907-9 period we find:

"Let us assume that red appears. And then it is just past. Still intuitive. Can we manage with the theory of representation? If a red were *still* there - actually experienced - in the same sense as the earlier red, then the red would really

simply endure, at most fading away, diminishing in fullness, intensity and the like ... The difficulty is discussed on my oldest sheets. In any case, there are objections here to my original view, my theory of representation, which operated with experienced *contents* (e.g. sensuous contents) and regarded them as apprehended in one way or another, depending on the circumstances ... such an interpretation might be quite untenable" (1991, 330-31)

If retentions are not presently-occurring representations of just-past contents, *what* are they? The only obvious answer is the one that Husserl seemed to adopt: retentions (or "primary memories") provide us with direct, unmediated, access to the past:

"Up to this point, the consciousness of the past - the primary consciousness of the past, that is - was not [called] perception because perception was taken as the act that originally constitutes the now. But the consciousness of the past does not constitute a now; it rather constitutes a "just past", something that has preceded the now intuitively. But if we call perception *the act in which all "origin"* lies, the act that *constitutes originally*, then *primary memory* is *perception*. For only in primary memory do we *see* what is past, only in it does the past become constituted - and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively. The just past, the before in opposition to the now, can be directly seen only in primary memory; it is its essence to bring this new and original past to primary, direct intuition, just as it is the essence of the perception of the now to bring the now directly to intuition." (1991, 43)

Recognizing that representationalism must be rejected in favour of realism is one thing.<14> Formulating an realist account of temporal awareness that is viable is quite another. If at each instant we have a direct awareness of the preceding phase of our stream of consciousness, then - assuming awareness is continuous - we will apprehend the same streamal phases many times over. The immediate past will be "seen" not once, but again and again. The problem of repeated contents is back with a vengeance! By insisting that successive stream-phases possess common parts, the overlap theory avoids the problem of repeated contents. What was Husserl's solution?

Before considering this issue, I want to comment on another. While not denying that there are similarities between Broad and Husserl, Gallagher argues that there is a significant difference to which I failed to give due attention. In his later writings Broad had no qualms about grounding his account in strictly durationless episodes of experience, Husserl, on the other hand, always took the view that instantaneous acts of consciousness were at most abstractions, since all actual awareness of time is itself extended over time. So whereas the later Broad accepted L1 ("The perception of succession requires a momentary and indivisible, and therefore durationless act of consciousness."), Husserl did not. In view of this, Gallagher suggests that Husserl was at most committed to a "weak" version of PSA, one which does not render the awareness of succession dependent upon momentary indivisible acts. Gallagher goes on to say:

"I would argue that Husserl accepts the weak PSA, and specifically as it is nicely and precisely formulated by Miller. "An awareness of succession derives from simultaneous features of the structure of that awareness ... A *continuous* awareness of a tone as enduring must involve an awareness of (at least) some temporally extended part of the tone at any given *instant* of that awareness" (Miller, 1984, p. 109). This describes Husserl's position correctly. One should note that awareness is continuous rather than momentary (versus LA1) (2003, section3)"

I think Gallagher may be right to think that Miller's formulation of PSA correctly describes Husserl's position. Husserl often talks of the present as point-like, of temporal objects being constituted moment by moment (1991, 241), and his various "diagrams of time" feature continuous series of momentary cross-sections of extended episodes of experiencing, where each cross-section consists of a momentary primal impression together with accompanying continuums of protentions and retentions. But if Miller's formulation *is* a correct interpretation of Husserl, then it seems clear that strictly durationless acts of awareness *do* play an indispensable role in Husserl's theory. How could it be otherwise if we are aware of some extended part of the tone at each *instant* during our experiencing of it? Gallagher suggests that for Husserl awareness is continuous *rather than* momentary, but these two concepts are not in competition: continuous stretches of awareness might have momentary constituents, in the same way as a straight line is composed of extensionless

points.

If this is right, we face a problem: reconciling the role ascribed to instantaneous acts of awareness, or momentary streamal cross-sections, with Husserl's claim that these are ideal limits that are nothing in themselves.<15> The two positions are not necessarily incompatible. I suspect Husserl always took the view that momentary acts and cross-sections were dependent parts (or "moments") of extended phases of consciousness, and so could not exist in isolation, but that they nonetheless perform real functions "within" extended acts, one such being the delivery of momentary primal impressions.<16> There is certainly a very real difficulty for Husserl's position if primal impressions are "not" momentary. Would an extended primal impression seem to have earlier and later phases? If so, how are they related to protentions and retentions? What functions do the latter serve if primal impressions are temporally extended, and so "in themselves" furnish us with a direct experience of temporality?

Gallagher draws a useful distinction between "theoretical posits" and "descriptive abstractions" (2003, section 3.3). Both concern "unobservables", features that are attributed to consciousness but which cannot actually be discerned. The role of theoretical posits is entirely explanatory. Such posits are invisible objects or processes, introduced so as to render features of consciousness that "are" detectable intelligible. Descriptive abstractions are quite different: rather than being explanatory posits, they are simply byproducts of the enterprise of putting experience into words. In trying to describe aspects of consciousness in ordinary language terms, it will often be the case that even the most apt forms of expression will be less than perfect, and will consequently misrepresent, if only partially, the phenomena in question. If I understand Gallagher aright, these misrepresentations - these discrepancies between the actual character of the phenomena and the phenomena as described - are what he means by "descriptive abstractions".

If so, then for the reasons just given, I suggest the "momentariness" of primal impressions is more than a descriptive abstraction. It is, rather, the inevitable consequence of Husserl's fundamental assumption, one that he never abandoned, that even the shortest-lived experience of change or duration involves the tri-partite structure of retentions, primal impression and protentions. This assumption not only leads to the postulating of indiscernible features and processes - the complex changes in protentional and retentional structures from moment to moment - it also prevents Husserl from being able to do full justice to the purely "impressional" continuity of consciousness. Although Husserl insisted that retentions and protentions are themselves impressional modes of consciousness (unlike re-productive memory and ordinary anticipations - see the quote above), he also insisted - in both his early and later accounts - that primal impressions are "originally present" in a way that retentions and protentions are not. As a consequence, change and duration cannot possibly be experienced with the same immediacy as colour and shape, the latter being features which can be apprehended in primal impressions. The overlap theory, by contrast, "begins" by positing extended phenomenal presents, all of whose constituents possess the same raw immediacy, and so faces none of these difficulties.

8. INTENTIONALISM

Let us return to our unfinished business. In shifting from anti-realism to realism Husserl came to hold that we directly perceive the past. But if each momentary phase of a stream of consciousness is accompanied by direct apprehensions of preceding stream-phases, the problem of repeated contents rears its head once more. What was the later Husserl's solution to this problem? In "SoC" (161) I suggested it was not clear that he had one. Gallagher suggests that he did:

"Retention, according to his later theory, does not retain real contents; it retains intentional contents. It retains the sense (the meaning content) of what has just consciously passed. Although there is this change in the status of the content that retention retains, it is important to note that the structural status of retention does not change. More generally, for understanding Husserl's analysis, it is important to know that retention, protention, and primal impression, as they perform their functions, are not themselves contents, either real or intentional. Rather, they are part of the noetic structure of the act of awareness. Retentions fall on the side of awareness, not on the side of content."
(2003, section 3.2)

The immediate past is apprehended in present consciousness, not in a sensory manner, but rather as a "sense" or "meaning content" that is apprehended by an act of awareness. If I hear "Do-Re-Mi", then my hearing of "Re" is not accompanied by a faded acoustic image or reverberation of the preceding "Do", but rather by an awareness of a meaning-content, not necessarily of the linguistic or conceptual variety, and the presence of this meaning-content in my consciousness provides me with an awareness that the currently experienced "Re" was immediately preceded by an experiencing of "Do". As Gallagher points out, since on this view retentions (and likewise protentions) do not possess any sensory content, the "clogging" and "lingering" difficulties which afflicted Husserl's earlier theory - and Broad's later theory - do not arise. The new theory does not overload consciousness with sensory contents that we know do not in fact exist. A further consideration counts in its favour. As I noted at the end section 6, when discussing fringe experience, we often do have a non-sensory and non-linguistic but nonetheless contentful feeling of what has just occurred, along with an anticipatory sense of what is about to occur.

The purely intentional theory Gallagher ascribes to Husserl has definite advantages. Nonetheless, there are reasons for doubting whether an adequate account of temporal experience can be constructed on this basis. Pure intentionalism is suspect on purely

phenomenological grounds.

The most obvious difficulty is probably the most serious. Entirely abolishing the sensory from every aspect of the experience of temporality certainly solves the lingering-content problem that afflicts representational theories, but it results in an unrecognizable picture of our streams of consciousness - the resulting picture is simply too thin, too transparent, too "ethereal". I speculated earlier that some of the meditation-induced conditions which are often characterized as "nothingness" may in fact consist of pure fringe-consciousness. Sensory experience in all its forms is absent, but consciousness continues on, in the form of non-sensory intuitive feelings (e.g. of well-being, contentment). Experience of this sort may well be possible, even if it is difficult to imagine clearly. But as is plain, a pure fringe consciousness is "very" different from the sort of consciousness we normally enjoy, precisely because the former is devoid of sensory elements (no sound, no colour, no bodily feeling, and so forth), whereas the latter is not. So far as I can see, Gallagher's intentional account absurdly entails that our "ordinary" experience must resemble meditation-induced "pure consciousness", at least to the extent of being entirely non-sensory!

I fully agree that there is a non-sensory element in our ordinary experience of temporality, but there is surely a sensory element too, even if the sensory element is itself usually imbued with, or accompanied by, intentional content of some kind. Again, think what it is like to hear a tone: isn't there a "droning on", an ongoing flow of auditory sensation that is experienced "as" flowing on? If this flowing sensation were replaced by a collection of pure meanings what would result? It is not clear. All that "is" clear is that the result would not be an auditory experience.<17>

I have been calling the account Gallagher ascribes to Husserl the "pure intentional theory" for a reason. As the quotation above makes clear, according to this account it is not only protentions and retentions that are reduced to non-sensory meaning-contents, so too are primal impressions, at least they are in so far as they contribute to our experience of temporality, which is what matters for present purposes. I have my doubts whether Husserl himself took this view, but whether he did or didn't, there is a weaker form of intentionalism - call it "partial intentionalism" - which on the face of it is more plausible than the pure version. According to this view, whereas protentions and retentions take the form of non-sensory meaning-contents, momentary primal impressions possess both noetic "and" sensory components. Our streams of consciousness thus have a continuous sensory foundation, but our awareness of this continuity is confined to the non-sensory (intentional) level.<18>

Partial intentionalism is unquestionably an improvement on its pure predecessor, but it still won't do. The sensory is no longer absent, but it is not present in the right sort of way: it is locked into momentary sensation-slices. Given that a continuous succession of sensations does not generate a sensation of continuity, partial intentionalism renders the direct experience of change and duration impossible. This fact suffices to render the theory untenable, for change and duration "are" directly experienced. When we hear a tone enduring on, we directly apprehend a sensory tonal quality enduring on; likewise for observing a coloured object: there is a direct experience of sensory colour enduring on - and if the object moves, we see the change. Since our experience could not be as it is were partial intentionalism true, we must conclude that it is false.

Even if the intentional theory in either form were to provide us with an acceptable account of an individual phenomenal present, there remains the now-familiar problem of how one phenomenal present is related to its close neighbours. The atomicity difficulty we encountered earlier, in the context of Broad's later theory, also afflicts the intentional account. A stream of consciousness is not a series of unconnected phases; successive phases are experienced together, they are "bound" together experientially.<19> So far as I can see, the intentional theory reduces a stream of consciousness to a succession of distinct acts of awareness, and is silent on the question of how successive acts are themselves related. This is not to say that it is guilty of failing to recognize the basic distinction between an awareness of succession and a succession of awarenesses. By its own lights it does recognize the distinction, but it does so in a limited way: each individual act is a nexus of retentions, primal impressions and protentions, and so generates an awareness (of a sort) of succession or duration. What is entirely lacking is an account of how we manage to be "continuously" aware of succession, from one phenomenal present to the next, from minute to minute or hour to hour, rather than second to second. The overlap theory has no difficulty here: successive phenomenal presents are bonded by overlap, they share common parts.

9. INTENTIONALISM AND HUSSERL

Finally, there are features of the intentional theory which lead me to wonder whether Husserl himself would have been entirely happy with it. Husserl was certainly seeking a general account of time-consciousness, one applicable to experience in all its forms. The intentional theory could only serve as a general account of this kind if all experience involves or is accompanied by a complex act of awareness of the sort Gallagher describes. Did Husserl believe - in the relevant period - that all experience "does" involve an act of this kind? It is not entirely clear; but it is at least possible that he did not.

Sokolowski points out that in both the "Logical Investigations" and "Ideas" Husserl raises the question of whether non-intentional sensations are possible, sensations that are not imbued with sense by an accompanying conscious act, but in both cases he leaves the issue unresolved. In the 1928 edition of the writings on time-consciousness, Husserl seems in two minds; in the Third Appendix he comes down against the possibility, but in the Fifth Appendix he takes the opposite view. So what did Husserl really believe? Is there any way of knowing? Sokolowski suggests the solution lies in other Husserlian writings of the period. Since in an early section of "Ideas II", written before 1916, Husserl is sympathetic towards the notion of non-intentional sensations, it seems reasonable to conclude that Husserl "did" believe in the possibility of non-intentional sensations, but that he only arrived at this verdict after the bulk of the time-lectures were complete, sometime between 1913 and 1917.<20>

Section 10 of "Ideas II" ("Things, spatial phantoms, and the data of sensation") certainly makes interesting reading, although its implications for our current concerns are ambiguous. Husserl maintains that there is a kind of experience that is simpler and more primitive than the experience of outer objects: "We are always led back further analytically and arrive finally at sense-objects in a different sense, ones which lie at the ground (constitutively understood) of all spatial objects, and, consequently, of all thing-objects of material

reality, too" (1989, 24). Taking as his example a tone played on a violin, Husserl suggests the sound can be apprehended in different ways: (i) as an objective occurrence in space, or (ii), as a phenomenal item with certain phenomeno-spatial properties, or, finally, (iii) as a primitive sensory item, one that is not apprehended as possessing spatial properties of any kind. A conscious subject hearing a tone for the very first time might have an experience of the latter kind, and Husserl claims that here "with the pure datum of sensation, we encounter a pregivenness which yet precedes the constitution of object as object" (1989, 25). Sensations of this most elementary kind are originally given through "mere single-rayed "reception", a simple "grasping" at what is being presented (1989, 26). In these passages Husserl does seem to be recognizing that there can be sensations that are not informed by any sense-bestowing acts of awareness, sensations that are (in this sense at least) non-intentional. Moreover, these sensations would surely be experienced as enduring, flowing phenomena. Indeed, Husserl immediately goes on to say that "from such objects we are led, ultimately, to sense data constituted in the most primitive way, constituted as unities in original time consciousness" (1989, 26). Given the simplicity of these sense data, given their lack of intentional features, it is far from obvious, to say the least, that Husserl would have supposed they owed their temporal characteristics to the sort of complex meaning-structures that Gallagher's intentional theory requires.

This verdict must be tempered with a note of caution. Since in *Ideas II* Husserl does not say anything more about what "original time-consciousness" involves, it would be wrong to conclude on this basis alone that he would have rejected the intentionalist theory. But support for this conclusion is available elsewhere: in some of Husserl's writings on original time-consciousness. There are grounds for thinking that when Husserl abandoned the idea that the most basic kind of time-consciousness (and hence retention) could be explained in terms of the "apprehension-content - apprehension" schema, he also abandoned the "awareness-content" model itself, at least in its most general form.

That he might have done so is understandable. As already noted, if we ascribe all consciousness of change and duration to acts of awareness, we face the problem of explaining how a subject's *awareness* can itself be continuous, and experienced as such, as it clearly is. More specifically, we run the risk of being obliged to posit a higher-level stratum of awareness to bind lower-level acts of awareness into unities. Husserl was cognizant of this sort of problem:

"Consciousness is necessarily "consciousness" in each of its phases ... we must not misunderstand this primal consciousness, this primal apprehension or whatever one wants to call it, to be an apprehending act. Apart from the fact that this would be an evidently false description of the situation, it would entangle us in irresolvable difficulties. If one says that every content comes to consciousness only by means of an act of apprehension directed towards it, then the question immediately arises about the consciousness in which this act of apprehension, which is surely a content itself, becomes conscious, and an infinite regress is unavoidable. But if every "content" is "primarily conscious" in itself and necessarily, the question about a further giving of consciousness becomes meaningless. Furthermore, every act of apprehension is itself a constituted immanent duration-unity. While it is being built up, that which it is supposed to make into an object is long since past and would no longer be accessible to it at all - if we did not already presuppose the whole play of primal consciousness and retentions." (1991, 123)

In passage such as these, Husserl seems concerned to draw our attention to a "basic" or "primary" mode of consciousness, a mode which not require acts of awareness, or meaning-bestowing apprehensions. If all phenomenal items - acts included - possess this mode of consciousness in and of themselves, the otherwise unavoidable infinite regress of ever-higher acts does not get off the ground. As the passage above makes clear, Husserl viewed conscious acts as extended processes with phenomenal characteristics of their own, that are constituted (created) within streams of consciousness. This view is also found in other passages:

"... - the appearance of a house, the appearance of a physical thing; of "acts" in the proper sense (as occurrences that are sensed) - the "turning of my regard towards something" and the act of meaning; joy (over weather that has again turned beautiful), wish, predication, etc. All of these [are constituted] as unities in immanent time and are unities "whether one takes heed of them or not". The total consciousness constitutes a total unity: that is, the total consciousness "is consciousness" through and through, through and through a "flow of flows", and each such flow pertains to a unity. These unities are therefore the "contents of consciousness in the primary sense", experiences understood as occurrences that are

experienced ... " (1991, 303)

It is because all phenomenal items - "acts of meaning" included - possess an intrinsic form of consciousness that does *not* need any additional act of awareness that the stream of consciousness as a whole consists of a "conscious" flowing unity: "the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself." (1991, 88) The most basic form of constitution, the form that makes acts themselves possible, is simply the dynamic flow-process itself: new phases of the stream are continually being created, and each phase includes a retention of the immediately preceding phases, along with their retentions. It would surely be wrong to suppose that retention in this form - a primitive relationship between neighbouring stream-phases - should be construed as a product of the "noetic structure" of acts of awareness, in the way Gallagher suggests, and in the way his intentional theory requires.

Gallagher himself draws attention to a difference between ordinary acts and retentions: "The intentionality of retention, which some phenomenologists refer to as functional intentionality, is not the same as act-intentionality. It does not thematize its object, as does a full-blown intentional act (e.g., perception or memory). It functions more on the order of working memory, not just in terms of its short-term reach, but in terms of how it keeps hold of the just-past." (2003, section 3.3) But despite this difference, Gallagher's retentions are still aspects of acts of awareness. I am not sure Husserl regarded them thus. Of course, even if I am right on this point, Gallagher might still be right about Husserl's taking retentions to be purely intentional meaning-contents; such contents might be directly co-conscious with other stream-phases, rather than aspects of apprehending acts. I have already explained what I believe to be wrong with an account of this kind.

There is a related point worth noting. In holding that the "total consciousness constitutes a total unity: that is, the total consciousness *is consciousness* through and through", and by rejecting the idea that the "total consciousness" is rendered conscious by an onlooking act of awareness, Husserl is revealing a commitment to something that bears a striking resemblance to the *Simple Conception* of consciousness! Or at least, he does so in his writings on the experience of time. In other works of the same period, where the Pure Ego is in play, a different, or at least, more complicated, picture emerges - but this is not the place to explore these complications.<21>

Husserl was not alone in displaying sympathies with the Simple Conception. So too - and I mention this only so as to bring these proceedings full circle as well as to a close - did the Broad of *Scientific Thought*. When first considering the issue of whether the A-theory is true of all experiences, Broad initially favours a compromise position (cf. 1923, 254-257). Many types of experience ("true sensations") are complexes comprising an objective factor (a "sensum"), and a subjective factor (the act of sensing), and Broad thinks visual perceptual experiences clearly fall into this camp. But there are other types of experience which do not: Broad sees no reason to suppose that bodily feelings, the denizens of the "somatic sense-field", involve an act of sensing. Nonetheless, he goes on to say that if he were obliged to treat all kinds of experience in the same way, rather than adopting the view that *no* experiences involve a distinction of act and object, he would opt for the doctrine that *all* experiences involve such a distinction, even though this is by no means always obviously the case. Hence, in his subsequent discussion of phenomenal temporality and the specious present, he works within the framework of the A-theory. But in a later section, towards the end of the book, where the topic is the "Conditions and Status of Sensa", a different view is tentatively announced. He observes that while a person can be alive without being consciously awake, a person's brain will only be in a fit condition to *be* awake (and so sense anything) if the rest of their body is functioning reasonably well. And since a functioning body generates bodily feeling, such feelings will always be present whenever we are conscious: "the general process of sensing never could lack at least a somatic sense-field to sense, for the dependently necessary conditions of the former are the originative conditions of the latter" (1923, 520). This result leads him to venture a speculation

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"We have never attempted, so far, to analyse what is meant by an act of sensing. We have assumed that, when a sensum is sensed, it stands in some special relation to something else, and that it would not stand in this relation to this something if it were not being sensed. But we have never attempted to state what this something is, nor to describe this relation. ... I suggest, very tentatively, that "getting sensed" may just mean "coming into such relations with the somatic sense-history as to form with it a general sense-history." On this view a sensation of a red patch would be a red sensum, so related to a *somatic* field that they form together a *general* field in a certain sense-history. A contemporary auditory sensation would consist of a noise-sensum, related in the same kind of way to the same somatic field. The somatic field itself would consist of feelings or presentations, which are not acts of sensing, but are unanalysable mental states. It will thus form the subjective factor in all true sensations." (1923, 521-22)

There is, I suspect, a hefty measure of truth in this speculation.

NOTES

<1> I am assuming here - with Broad - that the phenomenal present stretches from the "true" (momentary) present a short way back in time. On some views (e.g. Husserl) it also extends to take in the near future.

<2> Gallagher writes: "Dainton ... argues that the problem of repeated contents is avoided by Broad's later account ... It is not clear to me, however, why this is the case." (2003, section 2) What Gallagher finds unclear is why (as I put it): "we do not experience one and the same content over and over; we experience one and the same content sinking smoothly into the past". In writing the latter, however, I was still in expository mode, explaining how Broad's switch to representationalism was *supposed* to solve the problem of repeated contents. As soon becomes clear, I share Gallagher's doubts as to whether the solution works.

<3> See *SoC*, 115 & 134-135.

<4> Cf. *SoC*, 166: "Having taken this step [rejecting the A-thesis], it is now clear that in the context of the overlap theory, the same basic relationship of co-consciousness is responsible for the unity of consciousness both at and over time. Moreover, it is plain that although only brief adjoining phases of a stream are co-conscious, co-consciousness is also responsible for the unity of a stream as a whole."

<5> Gallagher seems to find all this rather fishy: "On Dainton's view, the flow of experience is no problem at all since experience is intrinsically organized as a flow ... Thus, the problem of temporal order is also easily resolved ... One begins to wonder why Broad and Husserl were so exercised. The way things seem to be is just the way they are." (2003, section 4) But isn't this precisely what one *ought* to find in phenomenology? The simplicity of the overlap model - the absence of hidden, introspectively invisible, mechanisms - is one of its primary virtues.

<6> I hope the preceding remarks go some way towards answering some of the questions Gallagher poses right at the end of his paper: "Furthermore, exactly what does a temporal overlapping of content or experience mean in the absence of awareness? Is it a real (*reell*) overlap or an intentional overlap? Or is it something different? If it is an intentional overlap, how can this be explained without noetic acts or the structural features of retention-protection? ... if experience is now simply running along the same line as the content, there is no good way to explain what exactly the overlap is. Unless these issues are resolved, the overlap model just won't float." (2003, section 4) It is perfectly clear what the overlap is: it consists in nothing more (or less) than the (real) possession of common parts by extended phases of streams of consciousness, and it does not require Husserlian "noetic acts" of any kind - though it is also fully compatible with their existence.

<7> It is this trivial variety of holism I had in mind in the passage cited by Gallagher: "Dainton writes: 'If my visual field were in any way different, it would have a different phenomenal character. If my visual field had a different phenomenal character, my overall consciousness would also have a different character' (2000, 24)"

<8> Cf. *SoC*, 231 & 245.

<9> Contrary to what Gallagher fears: "if we abandon the A-thesis, and thereby abandon the notion of acts, how do we handle the individuation of what Husserl calls *éact*-characters' - that is, what one might call attitudinal distinctions between perceptual experiences, vs memory or imagination, judgment, belief, emotion, etc.?" (2003, section 4)

<10> This feeling is particularly strong in "tip of the tongue" cases, which James memorably described thus: "Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term ... There are innumerable consciousnesses of emptiness, but all different from each other ... the feeling of an absence is **toto coelo** other than the absence of a feeling. It is an intense feeling." (1952, 163)

<11> "There are a virtual infinity of non-sensory experiences - rightness and familiarity, with their opposites wrongness and novelty, are only four of them. Once a person 'gets' the non-sensory dimension of experience, he or she will immediately see what a huge role they play in consciousness. Free-floating anxiety, the feeling of causal connectedness, the sense of 'mineness' underlying our concept of self, many aspects of emotion - these are all non-sensory experiences - as are the realm of intuition and hunches. Any experience that is not a sensation is non-sensory. The list is endless. All expressive feelings such as the sorrow of the willow or the joy of sunshine are non-sensory experiences. ... It is safe to say that any experience that occurs in more than one sensory mode is non-sensory." Mangan (2001, 7)

<12> Such feelings are related to what Husserl calls the "horizon" of an act of perception; cf. Husserl 1982, section 149, and 1960, sections 18-20; also Woodruff Smith and McIntyre 1982, chapter 5. Some of Husserl's terminology is distinctly Jamesian: "I am turned toward the object, for instance, the sheet of paper; I seize upon it as this existent here and now. The seizing-upon is a singling out and seizing; anything perceived has an experiential background. Around the sheet of paper lie books, pencils, an inkstand, etc., and also *éperceived*' in a certain manner, perceptually there, in the 'field of intuition;' but, during the advertence to the sheet of paper, they were there without even a secondary advertence and seizing upon ... Every perception of a physical thing has, in this manner, a halo of background-intuitions ... and that is also a 'mental process of consciousness', or, more briefly, 'consciousness'" (1982, 70, italics in the original). Here Husserl seems to endorse an expanded notion of "consciousness", one which embraces experiences of the non-sensory, purely intuitive, "fringe" variety.

<13> E.g. *SoC*, 27 where I say Broad rejected his initial account in favour of one "similar" to one Husserl had considered in some of his earlier writings, whereas Husserl moved in a direction reminiscent of the theory Broad had initially advocated; and *SoC*, 136 where I say Broad's early account is "in some respects" similar to one discernible in Husserl's later writings.

<14> Brough describes the new position thus: "Husserl's mature interpretation of retention, which appears in approximately 1909, takes

retention to be a 'direct' intending of what is just past, not mediated by any sort of present contents. What Husserl, in effect, insists upon, is the overthrow of the prejudice of the now, the view that one could not possibly be directly and immediately conscious of the past because it is gone, lost, and that one must therefore gain access to the past through present contents, contents really contained in the now of consciousness. The prejudice of the now amounts to the claim that the only way we can know the past is by keeping it around in the present in some more or less literal sense. Even the term 'retention' might suggest that." (1989, 275)

<15> "In the ideal sense, then, perception (impression) would be the phase of consciousness that constitutes the pure now ... But the now is precisely only an ideal limit, something abstract, which can be nothing by itself." (1991, 42)

<16> "... the running-off phenomenon is a continuity of constant changes. This continuity forms an inseparable unity, inseparable into extended sections that could exist by themselves and inseparable into phases that could exist by themselves, into points of the continuity. The parts that we single out by abstraction can exist only in the whole" (1991, 29) Also: "... if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point". (1991, 78)

<17> Perhaps I am misinterpreting Gallagher; perhaps he thinks retentions 'do' possess a sensory component. If so, the problems of lingering and repeating contents come to the fore once more! It should be pointed out that much controversy surrounds Husserl's theory of intentional content: there are at least five competing interpretations (cf. Woodruff Smith & Smith, 1995, 23)

<18> I may be guilty of reading too much into this one passage. Elsewhere Gallagher writes: "Since retention functions in an 'intentional' way, what remains present in consciousness, i.e., what remains present as part of the specious present, is not the just-past note itself, or the memory image, or the sensation of the just-past note ... Rather, the only thing that is really ('reell') present in the specious present is delivered by the current primal impression; the just-past is retained as part of the specious present only as the perceptual meaning or significance of the previous note qua 'just-past'. It is 'intentionally' retained and helps to constitute the intentionally intuited duration (the specious present). The specious present does not consist of a set of simultaneous sense-data; rather, it has a semantic or intentional status." (1998, 51) The position that Gallagher ascribes to Husserl here resembles what I have called "partial intentionalism", although the final sentence - which suggests the specious present as a whole is wholly intentional - is suggestive of pure intentionalism. At the very least, there appears to be an unresolved tension between the earlier and later parts of this passage.

<19> Cf. the discussion of the phenomenal binding constraint, 'SoC' 5.5.

<20> Sokolowski (1964, 110-113).

<21> Husserl certainly came around to the view that consciousness involved an "ego-pole". However, so far as I can see, Husserl's "discovery" of the transcendental ego, does not significantly impinge upon his account of time-consciousness. The ego may be ultimately responsible for the binding together of primary impressions, retentions and protentions, but our experience of temporality is due entirely to the latter modes of consciousness and their interrelations - the way in which they are unified in consciousness through a process of "passive synthesis", i.e., a process that does not involve conscious acts. Consequently, the unity of consciousness is not accounted for simply by ascribing phenomenal items to an enduring ego-substance. It is the activities of the ego - or perhaps more accurately, the phenomenal effects of its activities - rather than its mere existence, which underlies our experience of time. Or at least, this is the case for the simplest and most basic forms of phenomenal temporality. As the repository of a wide range of dispositional mental states (e.g. memory) the ego also has an important role to play in other important aspects of our experience of time. See Smith (2003) for an account of the later Husserl's (in some respects, highly distinctive) views on the Ego. Smith also provides an excellent exposition of Husserl's theory of time-consciousness (pp. 86-100).

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