THE PERI-CONSCIOUS SUBSTRATES OF AFFECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
Jaak Panksepp
Department of Psychology
J.P. Scott Center for Neuroscience Mind and Behavior
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403
U.S.A.
jpankse@bgnet.bgsu.edu
Copyright (c) Jaak Panksepp 2003
PSYCHE, 9(15), December 2003
Previously held: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v9/psyche-9-15-panksepp.html
KEYWORDS: affective consciousness, emotional states, intentions, actions, neurochemical codes
COMMENTARY ON: Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation's Ghost: The Non-Sensory "Fringe" of Consciousness. PSYCHE, 7(18). http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v7/psyche-7-18-mangan.html.
The possibility that many of the phenomena of fringe consciousness may be fundamentally affective is considered from the perspective that cognitive and affective forms of consciousness can be distinguished in terms of i) "channel" and "state" functions of neuronal processing, ii) computational vs less-computational aspects of neuronal processes, iii) intentions-to-act vs intentions-in-action types of brain processes, iv) perception-to-action vs action-to-perception processes, and v) the types of neurochemical regulators. If affective consciousness emerged in brain evolution earlier than sophisticated forms of cognitive consciousness, then those ancient feeling states may tend to remain at the fringes of the more resolved forms of cognitive consciousness that captivate our attentional fields.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mangan has provided a thought provoking analysis of those subtle peri-conscious aspects of consciousness that are remarkably difficult to conceptualize. He has sought to clarify those "fringes" more in cognitive than in affective terms. Here I will attempt the reverse, keeping in mind many of the shared insights of William James, including his dictum that:
Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the flimiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. (James, 1902, p. 388).
Obviously, there are an enormous number of unconscious information processing steps that incoming sensory stimuli must go through before coherent perceptions are presented to the workspaces of cognitive consciousness. Although perceptual awareness is the most obvious aspect of consciousness, and a reasonable target for those who wish to clarify how qualia emerge from brain activities, the phenomenologically less distinct fringes may reflect brain/mind processes that are even more essential for grounding consciousness processes in the brain. Mangan toys with such ideas in provocative ways, and thereby provides a welcome platform for others to share their perspectives on this most interesting aspect of internal existence. Although I agree with Mangan on the importance of such phenomena, I would emphasize a rather different, albeit potentially complementary, perspective.
First, I suspect that there are a variety of these "fringe" phenomena, and probably the least compelling ones are the fuzzy "ghosts" that arise from the fringes of sensory/perceptual awareness. The more important ones arise perhaps from our abilities to have valenced affective experiences of various types, especially various feelings of goodness and badness (i.e., the varieties of positive and negative affects). Along with Damasio (1999), I suspect the grounding of consciousness is based on primitive types of bodily awareness, including primordial "self-representation" functions, that may be essential for emotional/affective experiences (Panksepp, 1998a,b). Of course when such emotional arousal is intense, one typically has full-blown affective experiences of remarkable intensity, which seem phenomenologically quite different from the typical modes of "cognitive/perceptual consciousness." It now seems clear that emotional feelings do emerge largely from rather primitive sub-cortical brain systems that have not received adequate attention in mainstream cognitive neuroscience (Damasio, et al., 2000; Panksepp, 1998). Experienced at full intensity, these internally generated states are more than fringe phenomena. However, at mild levels of arousal, emotional brain systems may establish low-level mood states, that are more in the "fringe" category. How many distinct types of subtle feelings like this can be produced within the mind/brain remains open for careful taxonomizing.
While Mangan focused on cognitive-type feelings of coherence/rightness and incoherence/wrongness, I suspect there are others more clearly related to emotional moods that may be easier to analyze neuroscientifically (i.e., since they probably have distinct neuropeptidergic codes). Indeed, perhaps the types of fringe-consciousness that Mangan focuses on are better understood as forms of affective consciousness. If so, then a rather different type of analysis may be useful to highlight what may be happening in the brain. Although, no one knows how to distinguish such concepts unambiguously, let me proceed with the assumption that these fringe effects are largely what I would call types of "affective consciousness," not merely of a "cognitive" variety which parse exteroceptive perceptual space into discriminable differences. I realize many may have trouble with this way of looking at the mental world, but the evidence for such distinctions is substantial (Panksepp, 1998a,b; 2000a,b; 2001a,b; 2002), and I will here amplify why such a distinction may be useful, perhaps essential, for understanding those subtle affective fringes that are always there even when we are in relatively cool-headed cognitive states of mind.
Mangan's analysis arises largely from the traditional cognitive science view that everything of importance in the brain can fall under the category of "information-processing" which may be an insidious assumption. I would suggest, that "information processing" is more important for understanding perceptual-types of "cognitive consciousness" than the diverse affective fringes that may arise from more ancient evolved systems that help code those intrinsic emotional and motivational values upon which our cognitive apparatus was built during cerebral evolution. The more cognitive, digital-type information concepts do not effectively clarify the more organic, subcortical forms of "affective consciousness" which probably emerge from massive network properties which establish the "drive" and "pressure" like states-of-being that are so evident during emotional behaviors and the accompanying affective states (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 1998a,b). Although Mangan toys briefly with the possibility that the fringe phenomena are largely mild affective states, it is more of a flirtation than a full development of that possibility. I will flesh out that alternative a bit in this commentary.
First, however, let me focus on why scientific investigators have traditionally had such a difficult time with such affective concepts. As Mangan notes, every phenomena in nature has to be attacked at three levels: "descriptive, functional and explanatory" with the last being "by far the most speculative." Basically these three amount to i) finding the correlates of a phenomena, ii) determining experimentally whether the correlates have causal efficacy, and iii) proposing "mechanisms" for how the phenomenal are instantiated in nature. Since "fringe" aspects of consciousness, including mild affective experiences, are incredibly difficult to operationalize, it is hard to specify their brain correlates. But many ancient evolutionary processes of the brain/mind (the evolved solutions embedded in the great intermediate net of the brain) may not be so fuzzy if we can study them in their full intensity. Partly because of that as well as the need to conduct causal experiments, I have chosen to invest in animal models where one can study robust and concrete emotional behaviors as indicators of internal processes. These processes can then be further defined by seeking necessary neural circuit characteristics (e.g., the brain areas one can electrically and chemically stimulate to evoke the psychobehavioral processes of interest). Such investigations are based on the simplifying assumption, not negated by any major data base to my knowledge, that distinct forms of affective experience arise largely from the arousal of the many sub-neocortical instinctual emotional operating systems that exist in mammalian brains (iotti & Panksepp, 2004; Panksepp, 1998a). These concrete correlates and potential brain sources of affective experience can now be validated by appropriate phenomenological studies in humans, especially by manipulating the putative neurochemical codes for primal emotions (Panksepp, 1999).
This type of research has led me to assert that affective and cognitive forms of consciousness must be distinguished if we are going to make sense of the evolutionary foundations of the human mind (Panksepp, 2003). I suspect that many fringe forms of consciousness reflect mild arousal of brain emotional systems, resulting in phenomena that are typically called moods and may be well conceptualized and mild intentions in action which shift in hand with various cognitive processes. Indeed, Mangan may be speaking of such mental phenomena (e.g., "experience of rightness" that reflects some kind of "global dynamics of network integration" which I suspect may arise from mild arousal of the appetitive motivational SEEKING system which supports vigorous self-stimulation in animal models).
Although distinct types of consciousness surely interact massively, I suspect that the affective forms provide an ancient form of "grounding" for the more recently evolved cognitive types. A recognition of such ancient embodied states of affective consciousness may help extract us from various dualistic dilemmas that sensorially focused "information-processing" modes of thinking can easily promote (i.e., that arousal of such subcortical systems have to be "read out" by neo-cortical cognitive systems before they are experienced). To help clarify this distinction, let me share a half dozen overlapping ways to distinguish these two types of consciousness. More extensive coverage of related issues have been summarized elsewhere (Panksepp, 2001a,b; 2002).
1.1. STATE FUNCTIONS VS CHANNEL FUNCTIONS
Marcel Mesulam (2000) highlighted that some aspects of the brain operate via discrete information channels (e.g., sensory-perceptual processes) while other operate more globally to control wide swaths of brain activity (e.g., the biogenic amine spritzers that can control overall brain arousability). This distinction, can probably be used to discern brain processes which produce highly resolved perceptual qualia from those aspects of awareness which are generally more fuzzy, holistic, and in the absence of intense emotional arousal seem to be more in the background rather than the forefront of consciousness. In my estimation, this distinction is essential for making sense of the type of fringe consciousness upon which Mangan has focused our attentions. Fringe consciousness may arise largely from mild arousal of the evolved state functions of the brain.
1.2. COMPUTATIONAL VS NON-COMPUTATIONAL FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Basically this assertion amounts to the claim that channel-functions, since they are dependent on some type of coding of action-potential frequencies and patterns in anatomically delimited channels, can in principle be instantiated using symbol manipulating computational models. On the other hand, the more organically instantiated forms of affective consciousness, although also dependent on neuronal systems, are not computational in the same sense. These systems depend on extensive networks that operate more globally, where action potentials do not convey discreet information but where ensembles of neurons develop analog pressures within the brain/mind for certain types of holistic feelings and actions. One might be able to computationally simulate the analog patterns of activity in the "fabric" of these global systems, but in doing so, we should not mistake these "cinematographic" depictions for real life. The global state patterns elaborated by such brain networks may generate an essential context for perceptual consciousness, establishing a solid organic grounding for more cognitive mental activities linked to discrete information-processing channels.
1.3. INTENTIONS-IN-ACTION VS INTENTIONS-TO-ACT
During mind-brain evolution, the non-computational state-control systems of the brain helped establish embodied instinctual behavioral patterns along with internally experienced affective states (Panksepp, 1998a,b). These instinctual arousals constitute an ancient form of behavioral control where a fundamental form of intentionality emerged as an intrinsic part of the action apparatus. This is, what I believe John Searle (1983) essentially meant by his distinction between intention in action vs intentions to act. Only with a more resolved sensory-motor apparatus, such as that which emerged with higher cortical enecephalization, can organisms operate in a virtual reality of cognitive-type activities, and thereby select and generate more subtle behavioral choices based upon the nuances of their perceptual fields.
1.4. ACTION-TO-PERCEPTION PROCESSES VS PERCEPTION-TO-ACTION PROCESSES
This distinction is very similar to the previous one. The assumption is that the affective/emotional state-control systems establish action processes which also help focus perceptual fields. Only with the emergence of highly resolved perceptual fields and cognitive awareness did the possibility emerge of buffering decision-making executive processes so that perceptions become more than simple behavioral guidance devices, but more deliberative ones for determining how organisms act. If ancient action-to-perception processes are fundamental for affective experience and primary-process intentionality, we may also better understand how paradoxes such as those raised by Benjamin Libet may be explained. Specifically, if primary process intentionality arises from the motor apparatus, there may be a mandatory lag between an act and the perceptual coding of that act upon an external referent, such as the moving second hand of a clock.
1.5. NEUROCHEMICAL CODES VS GENERAL GLUTAMATERGIC COMPUTATIONS
Neuroscientists have long recognized that a distinction needs to be made between the rapidly acting neurotransmitters that directly generate action potentials (with glutamate being the prime example of an excitatory transmitter), and those neuromodulatory influences which bias how effectively the rapidly acting transmitters operate (with the abundant neuropeptides being prime examples of neuromodulators that may regulate emotionally and motivationally specific state-variables in widely-ramifying neural networks). These different neural controls provide clear neural substrates for the distinction between the state and channel functions of the brain, each of which may figure more heavily in affective and cognitive forms of consciousness, respectively. Again, I would suggest that many varieties of fringe consciousness are linked more to the neural substrates of evolved affective/emotional states rather than the perceptual/cognitive channels of the brain.
Magnan has provided an important service in highlighting those subtle aspects of awareness that are too commonly neglected in consciousness studies. My commentary has been based on the assumption that affective and cognitive forms of consciousness, albeit highly interpenetrant, can be meaningfully distinguished in brain evolution by a large variety of organizational features. My main goal in this commentary has been to suggest that Mangan's description of fringe consciousness may largely reflect those global brain state-control systems which elaborate intentions-in-action that have already been the subject matter of a great deal of affective neuroscience research.
Since emotional states are so effective in channeling perceptual and cognitive processes, an increasing number of investigators seem eager to conflate cognitive and affective processes during the current "affect revolution" in cognitive science (e.g., Lane & Nadel, 2000). I believe this hinders a solid scientific confrontation with one of the most important and most neglected issues of mind/brain science—the fundamental nature of affect. Also, considering the fact that emotional feelings are so important in guiding cognitive and social decision making (Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio, 1998; Damasio, 1994) we must wonder whether the existence of cool rationality in the human mind has been overrated. We should remember that when the more emotional right hemisphere is damaged, the more rational/cognitive left hemisphere can exhibit a remarkable amount of egocentric confabulation and rationalization (Feinberg, 2001; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000).
In conclusion, perhaps my affective analysis of fringe consciousness is radical from the perspective of traditional cognitive paradigms, but this viewpoint can be bolstered further, following Mangan's lead, by focusing on Metzinger's tripartite "Phenomenal Self Model" which postulates three essential properties of "I'ness" -- mineness, selfhood and perspectivalness. In my estimation, this fundamental trinity of consciousness could also be called the bodily action self, the primal affective self, and the mental imagery/perceptual self. It seems to me that much of Mangan's analysis is devoted largely to the last of these attributes, namely how phenomenal consciusness is organized around a perceptual point of view. Perhaps consciousness first emerged from deeper evolutionary layers of brain organization, layers which first elaborated a motoric, affectively based primal self-representation (Panksepp, 1998a,b).
Although the last of the above three functions is easiest to study from a cognitive perspective, because those aspects are closely related to sensory channels where computational metaphors help conceptualize issues remarkably well, what is desperately needed are research programs that also try to tackle the other two levels. Those levels may be more ancient in mind/brain evolution, and hence more hidden from perceptual-experiential and hence experimental view. They certainly cannot be manipulated or monitored as readily. To make progress on those organic aspects of consciousness, I suspect that we will have to make a radical shift in perspective away from traditional "information processing" computational metaphors of brain functions to equally important organic "state control" functions of the brain (which remain too rarely discussed in cognitive science). Even though this deeper mystery is even more difficult to talk about coherently than the "ghostly" stuff that Mangan has so gracefully described, we must learn to talk about such ancient entities, including subtle concepts such as the core self (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 1998b) to understand how mind was truly constructed in brain evolution.
In any event, to make progress on such subtle issues, we must learn to discuss many psychological processes avoided during the 20th century. Only through the vehicle of open discussion can we develop credible model systems to study those subtle brain functions in the depth they deserve. If a new level of conceptual openness is promoted by Mangan's views, then they shall have performed an enormous service for advancing a coherent interdisciplinary mind-science that does not yet exist. As James stated in the sentence following the introductory quote I used to frame this essay: "No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded."
NOTES
I wish to thank John Eastwood for useful feedback on this commentary.
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