Consciousness Reconsidered
by Owen Flanagan
Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Peter E. Pruim
Department of Philosophy
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0126
USA
valerieh@vtvm1.cc.vt.edu
Copyright (c) Valerie Gray Hardcastle and Peter E. Pruim 1993
PSYCHE, 1(2), December 1993
Previously held: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v1/psyche-1-2-hardcastle.html
Keywords: constructive naturalism, eliminativism, methodology,
neo-Darwinian theory of mind, evolution of consciousness
1.1 Owen Flanagan is very clear about what his latest book,
Consciousness Reconsidered is supposed to do. He writes
that ``we can make intelligible the existence of
consciousness in the natural world,'' (p. 2) and that his
``aim is to say something illuminating about the nature,
function, and origin of consciousness'' (p. 1). However, he
is quick to point out that he is ``[providing] no argument
against non-naturalism,'' (p. 2) ``the view that consciousness
is not a natural phenomenon and therefore cannot be
understood in naturalist terms'' (p. 1).
1.2 We remark upon this because what Flanagan actually
accomplishes in the book is almost exactly the opposite of
his expectations. That is, he in fact provides several very
persuasive arguments against non-naturalism, yet (in our
opinion) is not successful at explaining the existence of
consciousness. There is nevertheless much about his book to
recommend it, and to recommend it highly; however, what we
admire most about Consciousness Reconsidered --- his
discussions of the ``new mysterians'' and other skeptical
breeds --- is what Flanagan undervalues, and where we think
Flanagan slips is in his positive program --- articulating a
framework for understanding consciousness.
1.3 There are two distinct aspects to Flanagan's book. On
the one hand, Flanagan presents arguments against those who
are skeptical of the naturalizing project. On the other, he
sketches a positive view of how consciousness might in fact
fit into the natural world. Unfortunately, as we understand
matters, these two aspects --- as Flanagan conceives them ---
end up being in tension because the natural method he
advocates requires more than the armchair speculation found
in some sections of the book.
1.4 Flanagan advocates a methodology that he calls ``constructive
naturalism,'' an approach that would use first person reports
of phenomenal experiences, psychological models of our
cognitive processes, and neurophysiological data concerning
how those processes are implemented in the brain to
triangulate onto a theory of consciousness (though we were a
bit disappointed to see that when he tried to apply that
method, he quoted from other philosophers more often than
the scientists themselves). A very sensible approach; in
fact, in reading Flanagan's description, one is struck by
the fact that this approach is so new, since once described,
it seems so prudent and obvious. But that is part of the
beauty of Flanagan --- he can make hard things seem easy,
intuitive positions seem silly, and his point of view seem
almost mundane. And that is just what forays into
consciousness these days demand --- a sensible, balanced,
no-nonsense, articulate examination of what in damnation it
is that we are talking about when we talk about our
qualitative experiences.
1.5 Flanagan's outstanding achievements in this book by far
are his arguments against non-naturalism --- they are clear,
subtle, persuasive and illuminating. He considers an
enormous variety of contemporary non-naturalistic positions
and arguments and carefully explains why they are misleading
or misguided or just plain wrong. And he does this without
making straw figures of his opponents. His characterization
of eliminativists and epiphenomenalists (e.g., Patricia
Churchland, Georges Rey, Paul Churchland) on the one hand,
and the neo-mysterians (e.g., Thomas Nagel, Colin McGinn,
Frank Jackson) on the other, would serve as a superb text
for introducing those positions. In addition, he outlines
in some detail other possible replies to the non-naturalist
position, how those replies differ from his own, and why his
are preferable.
1.6 For example, in the chapter ``Quining Consciousness,''
Flanagan details subtle differences in the eliminativist
arguments offered by Patricia Churchland (1983) and Georges
Rey (1983), who each draw analogies between the concepts of
consciousness and other concepts that have been dropped from
our theoretical framework, ``phlogiston'' and ``karma,''
respectively. The disanalogy Flanagan finds between
consciousness and phlogiston is that the term ``phlogiston''
is associated with a regimented, orthodox conception which
was discovered to have a null extension; however, there is
yet no regimented, canonical concept of consciousness,
hence, we are not yet in a position to discover that it has
a null extension. Ironically, one of the very complaints
which Churchland has about the concept serves to undercut
her argument for its elimination. What is sometimes put
forward by philosophers as the canonical concept --- a
transparent, incorrigible, immaterial state --- may be
regarded as a probably false set of claims about
consciousness. However, that these claims are true of no
object does not entail that consciousness does not exist if
these claims are not regarded as constitutive of the notion.
Instead, Flanagan suggests that ``conscious experience names
the class of mental states or events that involve awareness.
A conscious experience is a state such that there is
something it is like to be in it. Luckily, these ideas are
vague and compatible with all manner of theoretical
refinement'' (p. 31). And this starting point allows him to
point out the disanlogy he finds between the notion of karma
and consciousness. The notion of karma functions only as a
proposed explanans; ``karma'' does not pick out some phenomena
to be explained in some deeper way. Once we drop karma as
an explanans, nothing of the notion remains. In contrast,
consciousness is a robust phenomenon in need of explanation;
it is a familiar fact that some of our mental states are
states such that there is something it is like to be in
them. Consciousness is an explanandum.
1.7 We find his arguments along these lines to be very
persuasive, so we remain a bit puzzled at his opening
disclaimer: why shouldn't we consider these to be arguments
against those skeptical of building a theory of
consciousness? Flanagan is too modest.
1.8 The upshot of the passages is that the notion of
consciousness being a bit muddled is exactly what saves it
in the end. There is no canonical view of what is necessary
and sufficient for being consciousness. Nevertheless, this
fact does not make us powerless. There still is lots we can
do to learn about the why's and wherefore's of conscious
experience, hence, the advocation of constructive
naturalism. As Rorty (1982) remarks, studying consciousness
is just like studying anything else. Flanagan reminds us
what this means.
1.9 However, Flanagan's admitting that we really know very
little about consciousness sits uneasily with the second
aspect of his book, ``saying something illuminating about the
nature, function, and origin of consciousness.'' If we
really do know very little about consciousness, even though
we fully expect to know a great deal about it someday, and
even if we have good reason to believe consciousness is part
of the natural world, then ipso facto we cannot now say much
intelligible about consciousness's origins and functions.
1.10 Indeed, we find Flanagan's attempt to locate
plausible aspect of the book (Chapters 2 and 10). Flanagan
first asserts that the best view we have of the mind/brain
today is as having evolved under Darwinian selection
pressures to help us represent the world to ourselves in
order to facilitate the notorious four F's: feeding,
fighting, fleeing, and reproducing. Let us assume that this
is true. Flanagan then suggests that we should consider
thought qua problem- solving strategies as a miniature
pseudo-Darwinian struggle in which different ideas ``fight''
among themselves to survive (and presumably reproduce
somehow?). The contents of consciousness then reflect the
winner, the best solution to whatever problem currently
engages the brain. We see no reason to adopt Flanagan's
second assumption --- why should we believe that conscious
experience is like that? Consider the following rather
trivial examples of a focused and vivid conscious
experience that does not seem to reflect any sort of winner
in an idea-competition: concentrating on threading a needle,
being engrossed in the latest horror flick, the sharp pain
in one's hand after slamming it in a door and subsequently
removing it. Why should we be conscious when having those
experiences, given Flanagan's story?
1.11 Flanagan does give a just-so story about how
consciousness could have evolved through natural selection,
but just-so stories run counter to his very simple
methodological suggestion --- use all the information one can
get from any science that seems relevant to the task at
hand; otherwise, wait until the data is available. Just-so
stories aren't very scientific. Indeed, as long as we are
allowed to spin arm-chair theories, why not consider
consciousness to be a phenotypic free-rider, like the chin,
such that no Darwinian story is going to explain its
purpose, since it does not have one. Though Flanagan's
story does cover quite a range of phenomena, including
personal identity, self-consciousness, and brain-damaged
subjects, we find it lacking what the rest of the book has
--- a critical, careful look at what we are justified in
claiming about conscious phenomena.
1.12 This defect notwithstanding, we still recommend this
book highly. Flanagan has dealt a serious blow to those in
the non- naturalist or neo-mysterian camp who would argue
that a theory of consciousness is either a pointless pursuit
or in principle impossible to give. Consciousness
Reconsidered should serve well as a prolegomena toward a
future naturalist theory of consciousness.
References
Churchland, Patricia S. (1983). Consciousness: The
transmutation of a concept.
Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, 64, 80-93.
Rey, Georges. (1983). A reason for doubting the existence
of consciousness. In R. J. Davidson & G. E. Schwartz
(Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation: Vol 3. New
York: Plenum.
Rorty, Richard. (1982). Comments on Dennett. Synthese,
53, 181-187.
